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In this article, Professor Krawiec evaluates the relationship be-
tween derivatives hedging and shareholder wealth through an anal-
ysis of both the legal and financial academic literature. She
contends that legal commentators who argue that corporate deriva-
tives use requires a broad rethinking of traditional corporate law
norms are mistaken. She further contends that if adopted by future
courts judging management decisions regarding corporate hedging,
such arguments raise a severe danger of undermining the business
judgment rule as applied to management hedging decisions. She
notes that much of the legal evaluation of derivatives hedging has
focused on pure financial benefit to the corporate entity, without
considering the costs and benefits to shareholders. Professor
Krawiec attempts to remedy that weakness by identifying the vari-
ous benefits that may accrue to shareholders from firm-level risk
reduction through derivatives hedging. She suggests profiles of
companies most likely to generate shareholder benefits through de-
rivatives hedging. She then analyzes the empirical evidence of ac-
tual firm hedging practices to determine whether this behavior fits
the company profiles previously developed. Professor Krawiec
discusses the implications of her analysis for corporate decision-
making and for legal policy. She concludes that firm-level risk re-
duction through derivatives hedging is a business decision, often
benefitting shareholders, that should be protected by the business
judgment rule as is any other disinterested, well-informed, invest-
ment or operating decision made in good faith by corporate
management.
We must admit that we too were somewhat taken aback when we
first saw this conclusion emerging from our analysis.... By 1963,
however, with corporate debt ratios in the late 1950s not much
* Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law. B.A. North Carolina State
University; J.D. Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Professors Paul G.
Mahoney and Richard W. Painter for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. I would
also like to thank Maggie Finnerty and Phil Van Trease for superb research assistance.
1039
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
higher than in the low tax 1920s . . . we seemed to face an un-
happy dilemma: either corporate managers did not know (or per-
haps care) that they were paying too much in taxes; or something
major was being left out of the model. Either they were wrong or
we were.
Merton H. Miller, 19881
I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate America considers risk management vitally important
and considers derivative financial products an indispensable tool for
managing many types of financial risk regularly faced by today's cor-
porations.2  This is evidenced not only by the recent astounding
growth in the derivatives markets-derivative financial products con-
stitute one of the world's fastest growing financial markets, with an
outstanding notional amount that recently topped $55.7 trillion 3-but
also by the explicit statements of financial executives themselves.4
Not, perhaps, since the great leverage debate launched by Modi-
gliani and Miller in 1958 has there been such a vast divide between the
views of corporate America and those of academic America. Not
content with criticizing derivatives speculation as socially undesir-
able,6 some academics have begun to question the seemingly more
benign use of derivatives as hedging devices, arguing that under the
irrelevance theorem developed by Modigliani and Miller, derivatives
hedging by corporations harms diversified shareholders. 7 To para-
1. Merton H. Miller, The Modigliani-Miller Propositions After Thirty Years, 2 J. ECON.
PERSP. 99, 112 (1988).
2. This article assumes that the reader possesses a basic knowledge of derivatives, their
risks, and their various uses. Those without such knowledge should see generally Kimberly D.
Krawiec, More Than Just "New Financial Bingo": A Risk-Based Approach to Understanding
Derivatives, 23 J. CORP. L. 1 (1997).
3. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES-ACTIONS TAKEN OR
PROPOSED SINCE MAY 1994, at 3 (1996).
4. See Kenneth A. Froot et al., Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment and
Financing Policies, 48 J. FIN. 1629, 1629 (1993) ("[Rlecent surveys find that risk management is
ranked by financial executives as one of their most important objectives."); Saul Hansell, Diving
into Derivatives Not as Dangerous as It's Portrayed, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 9, 1994, at HI
(reporting 1993 survey by Swaps Monitor which found that the annual reports of over two-thirds
of Fortune 500 corporations reported the regular use of derivatives).
5. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance
and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958) [hereinafter Modigliani & Miller,
Cost of Capital].
6. See infra note 36 (discussing the debate among academicians as to the social utility of
derivatives speculation).
7. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, Hedging Expectations: "Derivative Reality" and the Law and
Finance of the Corporate Objective, 73 TEX. L. REV. 985, 1016-17 (1995), reprinted in 21 J. CORP.
L. 3, 31 (1995) [hereinafter Hu, Hedging Expectations] ("To the extent that corporations spend
money on hedges for the purpose of eliminating unsystematic risk, the corporations are devoting
real resources to get rid of something that well-diversified investors have already eliminated.");
Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation, and the
Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1306 (1991) [hereinafter Hu, New Finan-
cial Products] ("[T]o the extent that a corporation is spending money to purchase hedging prod-
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phrase Merton Miller, either corporate managers do not know (or
care) that they are engaging in behavior that detracts from share-
holder wealth, or something major is missing from the academic
model. In other words, either they are wrong or we are.
Corporate America can rest easier, if in fact it was ever con-
cerned. A careful examination of the legal and financial literature
reveals that firm-level derivatives hedging can provide many potential
benefits to diversified shareholders. Furthermore, although many
questions remain unanswered and further research is still needed, the
available empirical evidence generally supports the theory that the
hedging practices of most firms are consistent with a shareholder
wealth maximization rationale.8
Some legal scholars, however, should reevaluate their position on
derivatives hedging. This is not to imply that all legal commentators
have reacted negatively to corporate derivatives hedging. On the con-
trary, such respected scholars as Professors Roberta Romano and
Jonathan R. Macey have long emphasized the many benefits that may
accrue to the corporation and its shareholders from derivatives hedg-
ing.9 However, arguments by some legal scholars that the advent of
derivatives as a common firm-level hedging device requires a broad
rethinking of traditional corporate law norms are erroneous.
Professor Henry T.C. Hu, for example, has argued that current
corporate law norms fail to provide adequate guidance to manage-
ment in a world characterized by derivatives and other novel financial
ucts for the purpose of eliminating unsystematic risk, the corporation is in fact hurting its
shareholders that happen to be diversified."); see also Lynn A. Stout, Betting the Bank: How
Derivatives Trading Under Conditions of Uncertainty Can Increase Risks and Erode Returns in
Financial Markets, 21 J. CORP. L. 53, 56 (1995) ("[P]ublicly-held corporations, banks, and invest-
ment funds that use derivatives to hedge against alpha risk may not benefit their shareholders by
doing so. Indeed, to the extent that transaction costs associated with derivatives deals reduce
corporate wealth, alpha risk hedging actually leaves diversified shareholders worse off."). Other
commentators have argued that corporate level risk reduction decreases value to shareholders,
but do not mention derivatives hedging specifically, although presumably derivatives hedging
would be included in this generalization. See, e.g., Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Sharehold-
ers: For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1074
(1996) ("Corporate expenditures to achieve diversification or protection from unsystematic risks
at the corporate level add no value for the diversified shareholder."); Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time
and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 277, 324 (1990) [hereinafter
Hu, Corporate Investment] ("Unfortunately corporate diversification is not generally beneficial
for well-diversified shareholders. Shareholders do not need corporations to diversify for
them."). Although most scholars questioning the value of corporate hedging to diversified
shareholders note that the economic theories on which such criticism is based are subject to
many assumptions and qualifications, they do not evaluate those assumptions in any detail in an
attempt to determine whether corporate hedging enhances shareholder wealth.
8. See infra notes 239-349 (Part IV) and accompanying text (discussing the empirical evi-
dence of firm hedging practices).
9. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Derivative Instruments: Lessons for the Regulatory State,
21 J. CORP. L. 69, 70-71 (1995) (noting that derivatives have many beneficial uses); Roberta
Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1, 5
(1996) ("Notwithstanding the spectacular losses borne by certain investors in derivatives, these
instruments serve important economic functions that cannot be overemphasized.").
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innovations."0 These new financial developments, he believes, require
a reevaluation of important questions such as whether corporate law
should mandate that corporate management act in the best interests
of diversified shareholders to the possible detriment of undiversified
investors; whether management should be legally required to deter-
mine the level of shareholder diversification; and whether manage-
ment should be required to assess the expectations of the
corporation's shareholders with respect to the firm's hedging policies
and practices.'1 Professor Hu has further opined that the failure of
corporate law to distinguish management's duty to maximize share-
holder wealth from its duty to maximize corporate wealth has led to
an essential dilemma in the context of corporate derivatives hedging.'"
If management has a fiduciary duty principally or solely to maximize
shareholder wealth, then corporate hedging will often violate that
duty. If, on the other hand, corporate management's fiduciary duty is
owed primarily to the corporate entity, then management may have
an affirmative duty to hedge firm-level risk. 3
While Professor Hu's criticisms of the failure of corporate law to
distinguish management's duty to maximize shareholder wealth from
its duty to maximize corporate wealth are cogent and convincing, this
article will demonstrate that a broad rethinking of the basic principles
of corporate law as applied to corporate derivatives hedging is neither
necessary nor warranted. In fact, if adopted by future courts judging
management decisions regarding corporate hedging, such arguments
raise a severe danger of undermining the business judgment rule as
applied to management hedging decisions. 4 Such inroads into one of
the foundations of American corporate law should be undertaken
only in the face of clear and convincing evidence that specified actions
are likely to hold little or no benefit for corporate shareholders or that
management interests may necessarily diverge from those of share-
holders in connection with such a decision. 5 This article demon-
10. See Hu, New Financial Products, supra note 7, at 1277; Hu, Hedging Expectations,
supra note 7, at 51.
11. See Hu, New Financial Products, supra note 7, at 1310-16 (discussing various shortcom-
ings of current corporate law and other questions raised by new financial instruments, including
derivatives); Hu, Hedging Expectations, supra note 7, at 45-51 (same).
12. See Hu, New Financial Products, supra note 7, at 1309.
13. See id.
14. The business judgment rule has been defined as "a presumption that in making a busi-
ness decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.... Absent an abuse
of discretion, that judgement wiU] be respected by the courts." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
812 (Del. 1984).
15. Although the business judgment rule is one of the foundations of corporate law, it does
not protect management decisionmaking under all circumstances. See Gries Sports Enter., Inc.
v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., 496 N.E.2d 959, 963 (Ohio 1986) ("The business judgement
rule is a principle of corporate governance that has been part of the common law for at least one
hundred fifty years."). For example, where management conduct holds no potential benefit for
shareholders, is tainted by self-interest, or takes place in a context, such as a takeover or sale of
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strates that because many potential benefits may flow to corporate
shareholders due to firm-level hedging, the corporate hedging deci-
sion is a business decision just like many other decisions impacting
shareholder welfare commonly made by corporate management. Ac-
cordingly, the decision of whether and how much to hedge should be
protected by the business judgment rule, so long as that decision is
made in good faith by fully informed and disinterested corporate
managers.
Part II of this article places derivatives hedging within the context
of the many other types of risk-reducing behavior available to corpo-
rations and introduces the reader to the "insurance debate" through a
discussion of both legal and economic theories of the firm, including
the agency problem in corporate risk reduction.16 Part III discusses
two distinct types of corporate risk-reducing behavior: conglomerate
mergers and derivatives hedging.'7 The article explains that, in addi-
tion to the theories developed by Modigliani and Miller, it is primarily
the empirical evidence of the wealth reduction effects associated with
conglomerate mergers that has caused academicians to question the
value of derivatives hedging. 8 The article then discusses seven fre-
quently overlooked means by which risk-reduction at the firm level
can benefit shareholders: (1) if firm-level hedging reduces systematic
risk,' 9 (2) if there are transaction costs associated with risky firms,2 °
(3) if the firm's investment policy fluctuates with its cash flows,2' (4) if
agency costs can be reduced through firm-level risk reduction,2 2 (5) if
hedging is a cost-effective substitute for vertical integration as a strat-
egy for assuring a reliable input or output source,23 (6) if there are tax
savings associated with reducing firm-level risk,24 and (7) if the firm's
shareholders are not diversified.
Part IV argues that, given these many beneficial effects of firm-
level hedging, it is possible not only to justify derivatives hedging on a
shareholder wealth maximization rationale, but to establish a "firm
the corporation, where there is a high probability that management interests may diverge from
shareholder interests, management decisions are not entitled to the protection of the business
judgment rule. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[It [the business judgment
rule] does not apply in cases, e.g., in which the corporate decision lacks a business purpose, is
tainted by a conflict of interest, is so egregious as to amount to a no-win decision, or results from
an obvious and prolonged failure to exercise oversight or supervision.") (citations omitted); infra
notes 76-77 and accompanying text (discussing the inapplicability of the business judgment rule
in self-dealing and takeover transactions).
16. See infra notes 31-88 (Part II) and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 89-238 (Part III) and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 89-102 (Part ILA) and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 106-21 (Part II.B.1) and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 122-77 (Part III.B.2) and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 178-97 (Part III.B.3) and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 198-214 (Part III.B.4) and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 215-26 (Part III.B.5) and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 227-33 (Part III.B.6) and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 234-38 (Part III.B.7) and accompanying text.
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profile" of those corporations that are likely to derive the greatest
shareholder benefits from hedging.26 Part IV then analyzes the avail-
able empirical evidence of actual firm hedging practices to determine
whether this observed behavior generally fits the theoretical firm pro-
file developed in the section. 7 Part V explains that, given the many
potential shareholder benefits associated with firm-level hedging, the
corporate hedging decision should be analyzed, not as a mere financ-
ing decision, but as an investment in stability. 8 Consequently, the de-
cision of whether and how much to hedge should be analyzed by
corporate management as it would analyze any other investment deci-
sion-through a cost-benefit analysis. This realization leads to
profound implications for corporate legal policy, which are discussed
in part VI.2 9 Specifically, calls for broad reform of current corporate
legal norms governing the firm hedging decision threaten to under-
mine the traditional business judgment rule protection of corporate
risk management decisions. The decision of whether and how much
the firm should hedge should be protected by the business judgment
rule, just like the numerous other well-informed, disinterested operat-
ing and financing decisions made by corporate management on behalf
of the shareholders on a daily basis. Part VII thus concludes that a
broad rethinking of traditional corporate law norms in the derivatives
hedging context is neither necessary nor desirable.3"
II. CORPORATE-LEVEL RISK REDUCTION:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE "INSURANCE" DEBATE
A. Corporate "Insurance"
For many years, corporate managers have engaged in a wide vari-
ety of activities that reduce firm-level risk. They diversify at the cor-
porate level through conglomerate mergers that reduce the firm's
cash-flow variability; purchase insurance against property damage or
liability suits; eschew risky projects in favor of more certain ones with
lower expected returns; and restrict the amount of leverage in the
firm's capital structure, despite the tax advantages associated with
debt.31 Today, thanks to modern financial innovation, they also hedge
financial risks through the use of derivatives. When debating the po-
tential benefits to shareholders from derivatives hedging, it is thus im-
portant to remember that corporate hedging is not a new and esoteric
phenomenon. Financial innovation has merely provided to the corpo-
26. See infra notes 239-349 (Part IV) and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 239-349 (Part IV) and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 350-61 (Part V) and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 362-80 (Part VI) and accompanying text.
30. See infra note 381 (Part VII) and accompanying text.
31. See Alan C. Shapiro & Sheridan Titman, An Integrated Approach to Corporate Risk
Management, in REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE FINANCE 215, 215 (Joel M. Stem & Donald H.
Chew eds., 1986).
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rate entity new and arguably less expensive varieties of hedging mech-
anisms. Much of the analysis in this article is thus not restricted to
derivatives hedging, but applies equally to other forms of corporate-
level risk reduction, broadly termed "insurance."
A derivative has been defined as "a bilateral contract or payment
exchange agreement whose value is linked to, or derived from, an un-
derlying asset (such as a currency, commodity or stock), reference rate
(such as the Treasury Rate, the Federal Funds Rate or LIBOR) or
index (such as the S&P 500). "32 Derivatives end-users can be broadly
divided into two types: hedgers and speculators.33 Hedgers attempt
to reduce risk by using a derivative contract to offset a current or an-
ticipated cash position. Speculators, by contrast, attempt to profit
from changes in the value of the derivative contract itself by increas-
ing risk, and thus potential return.34 Many of the most widely publi-
cized derivatives losses reported to date have been suffered by
speculators,35 and most of the controversy surrounding derivatives use
has focused on speculators, rather than hedgers.36 Other derivative
uses may include arbitrage, the reduction of borrowing costs, and the
avoidance of various regulations. 37  Although these derivative uses
presumably provide benefits to corporate shareholders, the focus of
this article is solely on the use of derivatives as hedging vehicles.38
Until recently, very few commentators had questioned the sup-
posed benefits of derivatives hedging. 39 The traditional approach has
32. See Krawiec, supra note 2, at 6.
33. In reality, it is often difficult to separate a hedge transaction from a speculative one.
See Krawiec, supra note 2, at 16 & n.67; Hu, Hedging Expectations, supra note 7, at 12 n.39.
34. See Krawiec, supra note 2, at 15.
35. See Romano, supra note 9, at 5.
36. Although many lay observers and some academicians have criticized derivatives specu-
lation as socially undesirable, others have noted the market liquidity benefits provided by specu-
lators. Compare Stout, supra note 7, at 57-59 (arguing that while hedging and arbitrage
generally leave the average hedger or arbitrager better off and, absent significant costs to third
parties, can contribute to net social welfare, derivatives speculation decreases social wealth),
with Romano, supra note 9, at 5 ("[B]ecause the demand of business hedgers is rarely met by
hedgers on the other side of the market, speculators play an essential role in derivatives mar-
kets."), and Krawiec, supra note 2, at 15 & n.65 (noting the market liquidity benefits provided by
speculators).
37. See Krawiec, supra note 2, at 14-16 & n.63; Stout, supra note 7, at 57.
38. It should be noted, however, that the public costs and benefits of the use of derivatives
to avoid taxes and other regulations is a subject of much scholarly debate. Compare, e.g., Stout,
supra note 7, at 57 ("While conservative commentators may believe that such opportunities to
do an end run around regulators are cause for celebration, observers willing to assume that
existing banking, securities, and tax laws serve a public function should find the notion of 'regu-
latory arbitrage' far more troubling."), with Macey, supra note 9, at 76-78 (arguing that the use
of derivatives to alter regulatory consequences can benefit borrowers and other corporate claim-
ants that "are economically and politically weak relative to equity claimants, and where the legal
system does not adequately protect the contractual rights of fixed claimants"). For more infor-
mation on the various end-users of derivatives, see Krawiec, supra note 2, at 14-16.
39. But see supra note 7 (citing to legal commentators criticizing derivatives hedging by
public corporations). See also Romano, supra note 9, at 35-40 (illustrating the irrelevance theo-
rem as applied to derivatives hedging, but discussing several reasons why the irrelevance theo-
rem may be inapplicable in the derivatives hedging context); Corinne M. Bronfman & Michael
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been to note the many benefits that derivatives hedging provides to
the "corporation," with little or no separate inquiry into whether these
benefits also accrue to the corporation's shareholders. 4' This is con-
sistent with the traditional approach to corporate insurance generally
which assumes that firms, like their individual owners, are risk averse
and, like individuals, would rationally pay a premium to reduce risk.41
However, while risk aversion may be a useful assumption when ana-
lyzing individual investment activity, the risk aversion of corporate in-
vestors does not provide a workable rationale for the risk
management behavior of publicly traded firms, for reasons that are
discussed below.42
B. The Theory of the Firm
By allowing firms to diversify and hedge against unwanted risk,
derivatives enable risk-averse end-users to reduce both total risk and
the possibility of financial crisis. 43 This benefits the firm's manage-
ment, employees, suppliers, creditors, and other stakeholders with an
interest in the stability and continued existence of the firm. In the
absence of a constituency statute,44 however, the law directs corporate
F. Ferguson, Don't Ask, Don't Tell and Other Contracting Considerations, 21 J. CORP. L. 155, 170
(1995) (acknowledging the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theory, but arguing that "[dierivatives
are valuable to a firm's shareholders because managing risk reduces contracting costs").
40. See GROUP OF THIRTY, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES 34-41 (1993) (not-
ing the benefits that derivatives hedging may provide to the corporate entity); U.S. GEN. Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, supra note 3 (same); Brandon Becker & Francois-Ihor Mazur, Risk
Management of Financial Derivative Products: Who's Responsible for What?, 21 J. CORP. L. 177,
178-79 (1995) (same).
41. See NEIL A. DOHERTY, CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT 272 (1985) ("In most insur-
ance or risk management texts, the reason given for corporate demand for insurance is that the
'firm' is risk-averse."); DARRELL DUFFIE, FUTURES MARKETS 228 (1989) (describing investors'
risk aversion as the usual justification for corporate hedging). A standard assumption of modern
financial theory is that investors are rationally risk averse. That is, given a choice between two
investments with the same expected return but different levels of risk, a rational investor will
choose the less risky investment. The corollary to this assumption is that to be induced to accept
a risky project over a more certain one, the investor must be offered a "risk premium." See
WILBUR G. LEWELLEN, THE COST OF CAPITAL 8-18 (1969).
42. See infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text (explaining that, according to much tradi-
tional financial theory, risk reduction at the firm level reduces shareholder wealth because diver-
sified shareholders have already eliminated unsystematic risk from their portfolios).
43. "Total risk" refers to the total amount of variability in the firm's cash flows. As dis-
cussed below, this total risk is a combination of both "unsystematic," or diversifiable, risk and
"systematic," or undiversifiable, risk. See JAMES C. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
AND POLICY 66 (11th ed. 1998); infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing systematic
and unsystematic risk).
44. Constituency statutes permit (or even require) the board of directors to consider the
impact of corporate action on nonshareholder constituents of the corporation, such as creditors,
employees, suppliers, and the surrounding community. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1715(b)
(West 1995) ("[D]irectors... shall not be required, in considering the best interests of the corpo-
ration or the effects of any action, to regard any corporate interest or the interests of any group
affected by such action as a dominant or controlling interest or factor."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.59(E) (Anderson 1997) (permitting directors to consider the interests of the corporation's
employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, the state and national economies, and community
and social considerations when determining the best interests of the corporation); CONN. GEN.
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management to operate the firm for the benefit of the shareholders,
not for the benefit of other corporate stakeholders."a The relevant
question, therefore, is: does corporate-level derivatives hedging hold
potential benefits for the corporation's shareholders?
1. The Legal Theory
Both in law and in financial theory, the corporation is generally
presumed to be a profit-seeking entity owned by and run for the bene-
fit of the shareholders.46 Unfortunately, neither courts nor legisla-
tures have clearly defined what it means to run a corporation "for the
benefit of the shareholders." Part of this imprecision may arise from
the traditional "reification" of the corporation. In other words, a cor-
poration is traditionally viewed by the law as a fictitious legal entity,
separate from its owner-shareholders.47 While such an approach may
provide a means of conceptually simplifying a complex set of relation-
ships, it can also encourage a focus on "corporate welfare" without an
analysis of the effects of corporate conduct on the stakeholders in the
venture-the employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, and, in par-
ticular, the shareholders.48 Legal scholars, noting the potential dan-
gers of the "reification illusion" in general and of a focus on
corporate, as opposed to shareholder, welfare in particular, have ar-
gued against such an entity-oriented approach,49 and legal academic
STAT. § 33-756(d) (1997) (requiring directors to consider other corporate constituencies in deter-
mining whether to sell all or substantially all of the corporation's assets).
45. Although there is much debate as to whether or not corporate law should place the
interests of nonshareholder corporate claimants on a level of importance with those of share-
holders (often referred to as "communitarianism"), it is generally accepted that, in the absence
of a constituency statute, corporate law does not presently do so. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bain-
bridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green,
50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1445 & n.83 (1993) (recognizing and defending the legal mandate
of shareholder wealth maximization); Greenwood, supra note 7, at 1025 n.6 ("The 'communitar-
ian' vision, however, appears to be normative and aspirational; even these theorists seem not to
challenge the empirical assertion that as currently structured, the modem corporation is (largely)
shareholder-centered."); David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Cor-
porate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1383-86 (1993) (recognizing and criticizing the legal
mandate of shareholder wealth maximization). For more on the communitarianism debate and
the social responsibility of corporations, see ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 688-94 (1986).
46. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("A business corpora-
tion is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders."); see also infra
notes 55-56 (showing that the law presumes the corporation to be run for the benefit of share-
holders); infra notes 59-61 (showing that financial theory presumes that the corporation is run
for the purpose of maximizing shareholder value).
47. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BusINEss ORGANIZATION AND Fi-
NANCE 108 (6th ed. 1996); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Mana-
gerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976).
48. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 47, at 108-09; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 47, at
310-11.
49. See, e.g., KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 47, at 108-09 (noting the dangers of corporate
reification and urging the "decomposition" of the corporation into the participants in the ven-
ture); Hu, Hedging Expectations, supra note 7, at 30-31 (urging a shareholder-oriented, as op-
posed to an entity-oriented, approach); Hu, Corporate Investment, supra note 7, at 355
(promoting a shareholder wealth maximization, as opposed to a corporate wealth maximization,
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literature has for some time assumed a management duty to maximize
shareholder value.50
Corporate law, however, has generally not followed suit, stub-
bornly exhorting management to fulfill its fiduciary duties to the "cor-
poration" or to the "corporation and its shareholders," seemingly
oblivious to the notion that such duties may diverge in the daily man-
agement of the corporation.51 Outside of the takeover context, where
potential conflicts are more obvious,52 courts have often equated en-
tity welfare with shareholder welfare, implicitly assuming that any ac-
tion that benefits the corporation must, by definition, benefit the
shareholders.53
standard); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 47, at 311 ("Viewing the firm as the nexus of a set of
contracting relationships among individuals also serves to make it clear that the personalization
of the firm implied by asking questions such as 'what should be the objective of the firm', or
'does the firm have a social responsibility' is seriously misleading.").
50. See MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 97 (1995) ("[lIt is
generally agreed that management's principal fiduciary duty is to maximize the return to the
common shareholders."); KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 47, at 126 (arguing that "directors have
great discretion over how to maximize return to shareholders, but not whether to"); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 717
(1996) ("[Tjhe dominant American view remains a requirement that directors maximize share-
holder wealth, even if doing so comes at the expense of other corporate constituencies.");
Thomas Lee Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market) Failure, and Moral Values,
69 N.C. L. REV. 273, 286 (1991) (arguing that shareholder wealth maximization is "a goal gener-
ally recognized as paramount in corporate existence").
51. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT, § 8.30(a) (1984) (stating that a director
shall discharge his duties "in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation"); id. § 8.42(a) (setting forth the same standard for officers); ALl, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(a) (1994) ("A director or officer has a duty to the corporation
to perform the director's or officer's functions in good faith, in a manner he or she reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation ...."); Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994) ("[D]irectors owe fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders." (quoting Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan,
Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989))); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985)
("[D]irectors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to the corporation and its sharehold-
ers."); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 824 (N.J. 1981) ("[T]he relationship of a
corporate director to the corporation and its stockholders is that of a fiduciary.") (all emphasis
added).
52. Perhaps the most obvious example of the potential divergence in shareholder and en-
tity welfare occurs when the corporation is in "Revlon mode," that is, when corporate manage-
ment is faced with a choice of selling the corporation in a "bust-up" takeover and cashing out the
shareholders at a premium, or preserving the corporate entity as a going concern. Clearly the
corporation's welfare is enhanced through survival rather than extinction. Shareholder welfare,
by contrast, may very well be served by the "bust-up." See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986).
Delaware courts have recognized and responded to the potential conflict between the cor-
porate entity and its owners inherent in a Revlon-type situation by directing management to
maximize shareholder value and imposing a higher standard of judicial review on management
actions. See, e.g., Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 ("The directors' role changed from defenders of the
corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale
of the company."). This heightened scrutiny applies to judicial review of board decisions when-
ever a "sale of control" takes place, regardless of whether or not the target corporation will be
liquidated and sold. See Paramount, 637 A.2d at 42-43.
53. See David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 228 (1991) ("Dela-
ware jurisprudence makes this identity [of corporate and shareholder] interests explicit by
describing management's duty as a duty owed simultaneously 'to the corporation and its share-
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This does not mean that courts have openly favored entity wel-
fare at the expense of shareholders. Rather, it seems likely that the
traditional reference to the interests of the "corporation" originated
prior to the teachings of modern financial theory, not out of a desire
to benefit the corporate entity itself, but because the corporate entity
was viewed as a vehicle through which to benefit the shareholders.54
In those situations where the potential conflict is obvious, courts have,
in fact, explicitly directed management to maximize shareholder wel-
fare55 and, absent a legislative mandate to the contrary, have not al-
lowed management to favor other corporate constituencies over
shareholders.56 Nonetheless, the entity approach is problematic in its
failure to recognize that, even in the day-to-day operation of the com-
pany when management is not faced with an obvious potential con-
flict, some actions may favor corporate welfare while simultaneously
detracting from shareholder wealth.57 This entity focus has been par-
ticularly evident in the derivatives context, with many scholars, practi-
tioners, and judges extolling the virtues of derivatives hedging as a
cash-flow variance reduction vehicle, with little or no corresponding
inquiry into the costs and benefits such measures may hold for share-
holders.5 8 This article attempts to remedy that weakness by demon-
strating that corporate-level hedging of financial risk through
derivatives can enhance not only corporate welfare, but shareholder
welfare as well.
holders."'); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corpo-
rate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REv. 579, 586-87 (1992) (reasoning that despite recent
reevaluations of traditional corporate law principles, the "equation of corporation and stock-
holder interests has remained largely intact.").
54. At least one commentator has argued that the entity approach is motivated more by
historical reasons than by an actual concern for the welfare of the corporate entity. See Hu,
Hedging Expectations, supra note 7, at 19-20. Another has argued that, despite frequent judicial
allusions to fiduciary duties owed to the corporate entity, shareholder primacy has been a fea-
ture of American corporate law from the date corporations were first chartered in the United
States. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998).
55. See, e.g., Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 ("The duty of the board had thus changed from the
preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a
sale for the stockholders' benefit.").
56. See id. ("A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its respon-
sibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders."); Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("[I1t is not within the lawful powers of a board
of directors to shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of
shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefitting others.").
57. Even a clear legal mandate to maximize shareholder welfare presents potential
problems. See, e.g., Hu, Hedging Expectations, supra note 7, at 18-25 (discussing "traditional,"
"pure," and "blissful" shareholder wealth maximization conceptions).
58. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the entity focus by scholars and
surveyors in the derivatives context); Hu, Hedging Expectations, supra note 7, at 30 (citing exam-
ples of the entity focus in the derivatives area by practitioners and the judiciary).
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2. The Economic Theory
In contrast to the entity approach that has often dominated legal
discussion of the theory of the firm, financial theory assumes that the
appropriate objective for corporate management is to maximize
shareholder wealth;59 that is, to maximize the present value of the
shareholders' future earnings stream.6° This value is typically as-
sumed to be represented by the firm's share price.6 According to the
efficient capital markets hypothesis, the firm's share price represents
the capital market's assessment of the expected future earnings of the
firm given all available information, discounted to present value by a
59. See DOHERTY, supra note 41, at 16 ("Thus the objective for financial management is to
promote the economic welfare of the firm's shareholders by maximizing the value of their
shares."); VAN HORNE, supra note 43, at 3 ("The objective of a company must be to create value
for its shareholders.").
60. See, e.g., Shapiro & Titman, supra note 31, at 216 ("Modern finance theory holds that
the value of a firm is equal to its expected future cash flows discounted at the appropriate dis-
count rate.").
61. See VAN HORNE, supra note 43, at 3 ("Value is represented by the market price of the
company's common stock."). There is, of course, significant scholarly debate as to the extent of
stock market efficiency. For arguments and evidence in favor of and against the efficient capital
markets hypothesis, see generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic
Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 546, 551 (1994) (arguing that the efficient capital markets hypothesis (ECMH) is false, and
that chaos theory is superior to both ECMH and noise theory in explaining stock market crashes
and offering policy justifications for many corporate and securities law doctrines); Eugene F.
Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: H, 46 J. FIN. 1575 (1991) (summarizing 20 years of efficient
capital markets research and concluding that, while the joint-hypothesis problem makes empiri-
cal testing of ECMH problematic, the market efficiency literature "has improved our under-
standing of the behavior of security returns"); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A
Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 24 J. FIN. 383 (1970) (concluding that "with but a few
exceptions, the efficient markets model stands up well"); Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous
Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 95 (1978) (stating that "I believe there is
no other proposition in economics which has more solid empirical evidence supporting it than
the Efficient Market Hypothesis"); Andrei Scheifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader
Approach to Finance, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 19 (1990) (arguing that many of the assumptions on
which ECMH is based are unrealistic and pursuing noise trading theory as an alternative to the
efficient markets approach).
This article will show that derivatives hedging can maximize the corporation's "value" to the
shareholders and then assumes that this value is efficiently reflected in the firm's per share trad-
ing price. The implications of the failure of this assumption have been discussed at length by
others. See, e.g., Hu, Hedging Expectations, supra note 7, at 21-22 (discussing the distinction
between "actual" shareholder wealth, as measured by the firm's actual per share trading price,
and "blissful" shareholder wealth, as measured by what the firm's per share trading price would
be in a perfectly informed, rational stock market); Cunningham, supra, at 604-05 (discussing the
implications for management fiduciary duties under both noise trading and efficient views of
stock market prices); Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock
Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1028-30 (1992) (discussing the difference between fundamental and
actual share value and the existence of inaccuracies that may encourage management to increase
actual value without increasing fundamental value).
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discount rate that reflects the riskiness of that income stream.62
Therefore, to maximize share value, management must either maxi-
mize the firm's future earnings stream (the numerator in the net pres-
ent value equation) or minimize the risk reflected in the discount rate
(the denominator in the net present value equation).63
Modern financial theory, through both the capital asset pricing
model (CAPM) and the more recently developed arbitrage pricing
theory (APT), indicates that only "systematic" risks determine the ap-
propriate discount rate.64 According to both theories, investors, being
rationally risk averse, demand a risk premium to compensate them for
bearing higher risk. Because sophisticated investors hold a diversified
investment portfolio, however, they require risk premiums only for
the undiversifiable, or systematic, risk that remains in the portfolio
after full diversification. 65 Management decisions that alter the firm-
level amount of diversifiable, "unsystematic" risk will thus have no
effect on the discount rate in the denominator of the net present value
equation. Investors receive no premium for bearing such risks be-
cause they can be easily diversified away.66
62. See VAN HORNE, supra note 43, at 49. The net present value formula is typically repre-
sented as:
n
NPV = F At/(l+k) t
t--
where NPV = Net Present Value
A, = the cash flow for period t
k = the required rate or return
n = the last period in which a cash flow is expected
Id. at 141; see also RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 13 (5th ed. 1996).
63. See DOHERTY, supra note 41, at 16; CHARLES W. SMrrITsoN ET AL., MANAGING FINAN-
CIAL RISK: A GUIDE TO DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS, FINANCIAL ENGINEERING, AND VALUE MAX-
IMIZATION 102 (1995); Shapiro & Titman, supra note 31, at 216.
64. Under CAPM, this systematic risk is measured by beta-the sensitivity of a particular
firm's stock price relative to the market as a whole. See VAN HORNE, supra note 43, at 64.
Under APT, it is measured by the sensitivity of a firm's stock price relative to a number of
different risk factors. See id. at 94. Richard Roll and Stephen A. Ross have identified five such
factors: changes in expected inflation, unanticipated changes in actual inflation, unanticipated
changes in industrial production, unanticipated changes in the yield differential between low-
and high-grade bonds (the default risk premium), and unanticipated changes in the yield differ-
ential between long- and short-term bonds (the term structure of interest rates). See Richard
Roll & Stephen A. Ross, An Empirical Investigation of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory, 35 J. FIN.
1073, 1073 (1980) (concluding that three, and possibly four, systematic risk factors affect security
returns); Richard Roll & Stephen A. Ross, The Arbitrage Pricing Theory Approach to Strategic
Portfolio Management, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May-June 1984, at 14, 19 (arguing that empirical re-
search supports the theory that four systematic risk factors affect security prices); Nai-Fu Chen
et al., Economic Forces and the Stock Market, 59 J. Bus. 383, 402 (1986) (increasing to five the
number of systematic risk factors supported by the empirical evidence as affecting security
returns).
65. See VAN HORNE, supra note 43, at 68. This proposition has come to be known as
"portfolio theory" and was first introduced by Harry M. Markowitz in 1952. See BREALEY &
MYERS, supra note 62, at 155; see also Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 77-
91 (Mar. 1952).
66. See VAN HORNE, supra note 43, at 68.
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A related financial theory is the "irrelevance theorem," first de-
veloped by Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller in connection with
the effect of leverage on the firm's cost of capital.67 According to the
irrelevance theorem, a firm's financial policies, such as the amount of
leverage in its capital structure and the decision whether or not to pay
a dividend, are irrelevant to firm value, given certain assumptions
such as no taxes and no transaction costs.68 This is because manage-
ment, by leveraging at the firm level or paying a dividend, is not pro-
viding anything of value to shareholders that they cannot accomplish
on their own through direct personal borrowing or selling their shares,
respectively.69 Applying the irrelevance theorem to risk management,
some academicians have argued that corporations that hedge unsys-
tematic financial risk at the entity level do not add to firm value be-
cause they do not provide investors with anything that they cannot do
directly themselves through holding a diversified investment
portfolio.7"
Modern financial theory thus holds that a wide range of actions
that reduce unsystematic risk are, at best, irrelevant to firm value. At
worst, to the extent that there are positive transaction costs associated
with firm-level hedging, such maneuvers are actually wasteful from a
shareholder's perspective.7' Why then do corporations engage in con-
glomerate mergers, purchase insurance, pursue "prudent" debt levels,
forgo risky projects, and hedge financial risk through derivatives, de-
67. See generally Modigliani & Miller, Cost of Capital, supra note 5.
68. See id. at 268 (demonstrating that "the market value of any firm is independent of its
capital structure"); see also Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth,
and the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411, 414 (1961) [hereinafter Miller & Modigliani, Divi-
dend Policy] ("[Gliven a firm's investment policy, the dividend payout policy it chooses to follow
will affect neither the current price of its shares nor the total return to its shareholders."). Modi-
gliani and Miller later relaxed the assumption of no taxes. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H.
Miller, Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction, 63 AM. EcoN. REv. 433,
434 (June 1963) [hereinafter Modigliani & Miller, Corporate Income Taxes]; Merton H. Miller,
Debt and Taxes, 32 J. FIN. 261, 262 (1977).
69. See Modigliani & Miller, Cost of Capital, supra note 5, at 269 (discussing the effect of
leverage on firm value); Miller & Modigliani, Dividend Policy, supra note 68, at 413 (discussing
the effect of dividend policy on firm value).
70. See supra note 7 (citing to academicians who argue that corporations that hedge unsys-
tematic risk at the entity level detract from firm value). A variation on this theme is that the
corporation, through derivatives hedging, does not add value to the shareholders because it does
not provide them with anything that they could not provide for themselves through purchasing
futures and options for their own accounts. See DUFFLE, supra note 41, at 228; Froot et al., supra
note 4, at 1630; Romano, supra note 9, at 36. This argument, however, is not as persuasive as the
argument that firm-level hedging adds no value to shareholders because they are already diversi-
fied, because there are several reasons to believe that the corporation can hedge with derivatives
more cheaply and efficiently than can individuals. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text
(discussing the advantages the firm has over the individual investor in hedging risk through
derivatives).
71. Shapiro & Titman, supra note 31, at 215-16 ("[Tlhe theory of risk in modern finance...
seems to regard as irrelevant, if not actually wasteful, a range of corporate hedging activities
designed to reduce the total risk, or variability, of the firm's cash flows."); VAN HoRNE, supra
note 43, at 563 ("With no imperfections, it would be a matter of indifference to investors whether
or not the firm hedged.").
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spite the fact that these actions, at least theoretically, harm sharehold-
ers? One possibility is simple ignorance. Corporate management may
not realize that these actions appearing to benefit the firm may none-
theless produce no benefit for the shareholders.72 A more popular
explanation is that this divergence of corporate and shareholder inter-
ests results primarily from the separation of ownership from control in
the publicly held corporation.73
3. The Agency Problem in Corporate Risk Reduction
Except in closely held, owner-managed corporations, corporate
decisions typically are not made by the owner-shareholders of the cor-
poration. Rather, most corporate decisions are made by manage-
ment-that is, by paid employees hired by the owner-shareholders to
make operating decisions (including investment decisions) for them
and in their best interests. According to traditional financial theory,
numerous potential problems arise from the fact that it is employee-
managers, rather than the owner-shareholders themselves, who make
most corporate decisions.74 Obviously, management objectives do not
always coincide with shareholder objectives.75 Management may
cause the corporation to transact with them on terms that are unfair to
the shareholders, reject merger proposals that promise greater share-
holder wealth but carry the threat of incumbent management unem-
ployment, and accept or initiate proposals, such as a management-led
leveraged buyout, that entail substantial monetary or employment
72. See Hu, Hedging Expectations, supra note 7, at 38; RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S.
BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 347 (2d ed. 1995) ("Sometimes
this may be intentional, but we suspect that it more often results from the remarkable ability of
the human animal to convince oneself that what is in one's self-interest is good for others as well,
in situations where the latter proposition is dubious.").
73. See, e.g., KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 47, at 266; Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk
Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, 12 BELL J. ECON. 605, 609-10
(1981); Hu, Hedging Expectations, supra note 7, at 38.
74. The extent of the divergence of shareholder and management interests has been hotly
debated for 65 years. Compare ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 69-118 (1932) (arguing that the separation of ownership
from control encourages management to act in ways that do not maximize shareholder wealth),
with Jensen & Meckling, supra note 47, at 327-28 (arguing that market forces provide strong
incentives for management to contract with shareholders to reduce management misbehavior).
For more recent material addressing the potential for management-shareholder conflicts in the
publicly held corporation, see generally Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs v. Fiduciary Duties, in
PRINCIPLES AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 56-59 (John W. Pratt & Richard J.
Zeckhauser eds., 1985); William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Criti-
cal Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency
Costs and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Millon, supra note 43.
75. It is generally agreed that the interests of management and shareholders in the publicly
held corporation will often diverge. The debate, discussed supra note 74, primarily concerns the
extent to which market and contractual forces constrain management misbehavior and act to
align the interests of managers and shareholders. Compare BERLE & MEANS, supra note 74, at
119-25 (arguing that neither market nor legal forces adequately constrain management misbe-
havior), with Jensen & Meckling, supra note 47 at 327-28 (arguing that market forces adequately
constrain management misbehavior).
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benefits for management but cash out shareholders at less than fair
value. To some extent, corporate law has recognized the possibility of
potential conflict in these situations by exercising greater judicial
oversight of these types of management decisions. For example, when
reviewing allegations of management self-dealing or other breaches of
the duty of loyalty, courts will carefully review the inherent fairness of
the transaction to the corporation.76 Recognizing the temptation for
managerialist behavior in the takeover context, courts also subject
many actions of directors in connection with takeover activity to
heightened scrutiny.77
A less obvious area of potential management-shareholder conflict
is risk management. As previously discussed, traditional corporate fi-
nance theory holds that shareholders demand a risk premium only for
bearing the systematic risk associated with a firm's stock because they
have already eliminated unsystematic risk by holding a diversified in-
vestment portfolio. Risk-reducing measures that affect the corpora-
tion's total risk profile thus, at best, have no impact on shareholder
wealth and, at worst, reduce shareholder wealth to the extent of any
transaction costs associated with such risk-reduction measures.
Management, in contrast, is generally not well-diversified.
Although shareholders can own stock in numerous corporations, man-
agement is generally employed by only one firm. Furthermore, the
employment compensation of most managers constitutes a significant
portion of total income.7" Often that income is linked to the economic
performance of the firm (through profit sharing, stock options, or sim-
ilar incentive compensation devices), further tying management's per-
sonal wealth to the financial well-being of the firm.79 Management is
therefore extremely concerned with the firm's total risk. For manage-
ment, firm failure may mean job loss, financial ruin, and, because firm
failure is normally attributed to management incompetence rather
than to a rational decision to maximize shareholder value through
riskier projects that promise a greater expected return, a severely tar-
nished reputation that may preclude future employment (at least on
terms as favorable as those which management has come to enjoy).80
Consequently, according to traditional finance theory, management is
76. See Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6-7 (Sup. Ct. 1944) ("Such personal transactions of
directors with their corporations . . . are, when challenged, examined with the most scrupulous
care, and if there is any evidence of improvidence or oppression, any indication of unfairness or
undue advantage, the transactions will be voided.").
77. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del.
1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985).
78. See Amihud & Lev, supra note 73, at 606.
79. See id.
80. See id.
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likely to be more risk averse than what is optimal for the
shareholders.8"
In contrast to the more familiar areas of manager-shareholder
conflict, however, corporate law does not recognize the potential for
managerialist behavior in the context of corporate-level risk-reduction
decisions.82 In fact, the business judgment rule dictates that issues of
risk management, like most investment decisions, are solely within the
discretion of management.83 It is often argued that, as a result, man-
agers unconstrained by either legal or market forces cause the firm to
accept less risk than is optimal for the shareholders.
This has led some legal commentators to argue that manage-
ment's self-serving risk reduction behavior, combined with the grow-
ing prevalence of derivatives and other new financial innovations,
requires a broad rethinking of current corporate law principles.84 Pro-
fessor Henry T.C. Hu, for example, has argued that current corporate
legal norms fail to provide adequate guidance to management in a
world characterized by derivatives and other novel financial innova-
tions.85 These new financial developments, he believes, require a re-
evaluation of such important questions as whether corporate law
should mandate that corporate management act in the best interests
of diversified shareholders to the possible detriment of undiversified
investors; whether management should be legally required to deter-
mine the level of shareholder diversification; and whether manage-
ment should be required to determine the expectations of the
81. See id.; John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders v. Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web,
85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 19 (1986) ("[M]anagers will be more risk averse than their shareholders.");
Alan J. Marcus, Risk Sharing and the Theory of the Firm, 13 BELL J. ECON. 369, 373-74 (1982).
But see Hu, Corporate Investment, supra note 7, at 325-26 (arguing that when it is difficult for the
market to price the true risk levels of a firm's investment policies, such as when the firm is using
derivatives or other novel and sophisticated financial instruments, moral hazard may lead corpo-
rate management to take on too much risk); infra notes 333-34 and accompanying text (explain-
ing that managers compensated with stock options may cause the firm to pursue more risky
behavior).
82. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (discussing several situations that courts
recognize as posing potential management-shareholder conflicts, leading them to exercise
greater judicial oversight).
83. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that management deter-
minations as to the appropriate riskiness of the corporation's investments are protected by the
business judgment rule). The Joy court was actually arguing that management should not be
penalized for causing the firm to engage in overly risky investments, because such risky invest-
ments may be more profitable for shareholders. See id. at 886 (noting that shareholders can
reduce the risk of owning any particular stock by holding a diversified investment portfolio).
The same argument, however, applies to management investment decisions (including the deci-
sion to hedge firm-level risk) that stockholders allege in retrospect were too safe. Because firm-
level hedging holds many potential benefits for investors, the decision of whether and how much
to hedge is properly in the hands of management and, if fully informed, disinterested, and made
in good faith, deserves business judgment rule protection. See infra note 362 and accompanying
text (discussing business judgment rule protection for management hedging decisions).
84. See, e.g., Hu, Hedging Expectations, supra note 7, at 51; Hu, New Financial Products,
supra note 7, at 1277.
85. See Hu, Hedging Expectations, supra note 7, at 51; Hu, New Financial Products, supra
note 7, at 1277.
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corporation's shareholders with respect to the firm's hedging policies
and practices.86 He has further opined that corporate law's failure to
distinguish management's duty to maximize shareholder wealth from
its duty to maximize corporate wealth has led to an inevitable di-
lemma in the context of corporate derivatives hedging. 87 If manage-
ment has a fiduciary duty principally or solely to maximize
shareholder wealth, then corporate hedging will often violate that
duty. If, on the other hand, corporate management's fiduciary duty is
owed primarily to the corporate entity, then management may have
an affirmative duty to hedge firm-level risk.88 For the reasons elabo-
rated below, however, such a broad rethinking of the basic principles
of corporate law as applied to firm-level derivatives hedging is neither
necessary nor warranted.
III. CORPORATE-LEVEL RISK-REDUCING BEHAVIOR
A. Conglomerate Mergers
A frequently cited example of this conflict between management
and shareholder interests in the area of risk management is the diver-
sifying acquisition, which reached its popularity peak during the con-
glomeration wave of the 1960s.89 When conglomerate mergers and
acquisitions first made their way into academic discussion, they were
praised by financial theorists as a means of reducing the firm's cash
flow variability without reducing expected return, in much the same
way that portfolio diversification by individual investors reduces vari-
ance. 90 Early discussions of conglomerate mergers, therefore, main-
tained that merging or otherwise combining two corporations whose
earnings streams were not perfectly correlated could stabilize the
earnings streams of both firms by reducing or eliminating unsys-
tematic risk.91 Because the precombination expected returns of the
individual firms would not be reduced by the combination, the shares
of the postcombination firm should command a premium over the
shares of the individual precombination firms.92
Despite the popularity of the conglomeration phenomenon, the
empirical evidence has never supported the theory that such corporate
86. See Hu, Hedging Expectations, supra note 7, at 45-51 (discussing various shortcomings
of current corporate law and other questions raised by new financial instruments, including de-
rivatives); Hu, New Financial Products, supra note 7, at 1310-16 (same).
87. See Hu, New Financial Products, supra note 7, at 1309.
88. See id.
89. See F.H. Buckley, The Divestiture Decision, 16 J. CORP. L. 805, 808 (1991) (explaining
that the conglomeration wave peaked in the 1960s, but began to fade by the mid-1970s).
90. See Amihud & Lev, supra note 73, at 605; Gary T. Haight, The Portfolio Merger: Find-
ing the Company that Can Stabilize Your Earnings, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Summer 1981, at
33; Hiam Levy & Marshall Sarnat, Diversification, Portfolio Analysis and the Uneasy Case For
Conglomerate Mergers, 25 J. FIN. 795, 795 (1970).
91. See Haight, supra note 90, at 33-34; Levy & Sarnat, supra note 90, at 796.
92. See Levy & Samat, supra note 90, at 796.
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combinations increase firm value.93 Numerous empirical studies ana-
lyzing the effect of conglomerate combinations have concluded that
diversifying acquisitions do not provide economic benefits to either
the firm or its shareholders and, in fact, often reduce firm value.94
Why does what apparently works so well for individual investors
provide such poor results at the corporate level? According to many
financial theorists, the answer is that the irrelevance theorem dictates
that a conglomerate combination provides nothing of value to share-
holders that they cannot provide for themselves.95 Although combin-
ing firm A with firm B in an acquisition can reduce variance without
reducing expected return-something that normally will be valuable
to shareholders and for which they will normally be willing to pay a
premium-this same risk and return combination of corporations A
and B can be attained by shareholders by purchasing shares of A and
B separately. 96 Thus, according to many financial theorists, the con-
glomeration merger does not provide to shareholders anything of
value that they cannot provide for themselves and, consequently,
shareholders are unwilling to pay a premium for such a combination.97
In the absence of transaction costs, shareholders will be indifferent to
whether or not the corporation reduces risk at the firm level through
conglomeration, and the merger will neither add nor detract value.98
It is argued, however, that because the transaction costs involved in a
conglomerate merger are greater than those present when sharehold-
ers purchase shares on the market, the merger actually reduces share-
holder value to the extent of those costs.99
In trying to explain why this type of acquisition has remained so
popular, 100 many corporate finance scholars have concluded that the
93. See, e.g., DAVID J. RAVENSCRAFT & F. M. SCHERER, MERGERS, SELL-OFFs, & Eco-
NOMIC EFFICIENCY 75-122 (1987) (finding no evidence that conglomerate combinations increase
firm value); R. Hal Mason & Maurice B. Goudzwaard, Performance of Conglomerate Firms: A
Portfolio Approach, 31 J. FIN. 39, 47 (1976) (same); Ronald W. Melicher & David F. Rush,
Evidence on the Acquisition-Related Performance of Conglomerate Firms, 29 J. FIN. 141, 148
(1974) (same); Ronald W. Melicher & David F. Rush, The Performance of Conglomerate Firms:
Recent Risk and Return Experience, 28 J. FIN. 381, 387 (1973) (same); see also Buckley, supra
note 89, at 807 n.6, 808-09 n.9 (listing numerous studies that found no evidence of value creation
by diversifying acquisitions).
94. See Buckley, supra note 89, at 807 n.6, 808-09 n.9.
95. See Amihud & Lev, supra note 73, at 605; Levy & Sarnat, supra note 90, at 796.
96. See Levy & Sarnat, supra note 90, at 796.
97. See id.
98. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 72, at 317.
99. See id. Although investors incur brokerage fees to buy and sell shares when diversify-
ing, the legal and administrative costs incurred in acquiring or merging with another company
are much larger. In addition, although investors can purchase a corporation's shares at the pre-
vailing market price, corporate acquisitions nearly always take place at a substantial premium
over market price. See id.
Other reasons also have been posited for the value decreasing effects of conglomerate merg-
ers, including diseconomies of scale and the greater difficulty of monitoring management per-
formance in a conglomerate firm. See Buckley, supra note 89, at 825-26.
100. Although the conglomeration wave peaked in the 1960s, it remained popular even in
the period from 1980 to 1987. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 72, at 312 (noting that only one-
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most likely rationale is "managerialism" stemming from the separa-
tion of ownership from control in the public corporation. In other
words, although diversifying acquisitions do not benefit the firm's di-
versified shareholders, they do benefit management, which is undiver-
sified and, consequently, more risk averse than what is optimal from a
public shareholder's perspective. 10 1 Proponents of this theory often
cite as apparent support for their position empirical evidence that
close corporations make fewer diversifying acquisitions than do man-
ager-controlled firms.10 2
B. Faulty Assumptions Underlying the Argument
Against Derivatives Hedging
Analogizing to conglomerate acquisitions and building on the
literature in that field, some scholars have argued that financial deriv-
atives, when used to hedge against unsystematic risk, also decrease
shareholder value. 1°3 There is, however, a serious problem with this
analysis: it ignores one-half of the net present value equation.
10 4
While the discount rate in the denominator of that equation remains
unaffected by hedging because, at least theoretically, only systematic
risk is reflected in the discount rate, the numerator of the net present
value equation (the firm's expected cash flows) is unaffected by the
reduction of unsystematic risk only if the Modigliani-Miller assump-
tions hold true.10 5 While the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem
third of all large corporate acquisitions during the period from 1980 to 1987 were between com-
panies in the same industry). During the period from 1986 to 1990, however, few Fortune 500
companies made unrelated acquisitions. See Gerald F. Davis et al., The Decline and Fall of the
Conglomerate Firm in the 1980s: A Study in the Deinstitutionalization of an Organizational
Form, 59 AM. Soc. REV. 547, 560 (1994).
101. See Amihud & Lev, supra note 73, at 605. Professors Gilson and Black argue that
these actions taken to benefit management at the expense of shareholder wealth may not be
intentional, but rather are an example of management's firm belief that what benefits manage-
ment benefits the shareholders as well. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 72, at 347.
Other commentators have also argued that the conglomeration phenomenon may be ex-
plained by management's desire for growth, rather than by its desire for risk reduction. See
GILSON & BLACK, supra note 72, at 354-55; Buckley, supra note 89, at 827 (arguing that manage-
ment may seek greater firm size to increase its compensation or to make its removal through a
hostile takeover more difficult).
102. See Amihud & Lev, supra note 73, at 612 (controlling for firm size and finding a nega-
tive relationship between the level of owner control and the number of diversifying acquisitions);
William P. Lloyd et al., The Effect of the Degree of Ownership Control on Firm Diversification,
Market Value, and Merger Activity, 15 J. Bus. RES. 303, 303 (1987) (finding substantial empirical
evidence that manager-controlled firms engage in more diversifying acquisitions and have more
diversified earnings than do owner-controlled firms).
103. See Hu, Hedging Expectations, supra note 7, at 31 ("What may be a bit more persuasive
[in the case against derivatives hedging] is an increasing amount of empirical evidence suggesting
that corporate-level diversification generally reduces firm value."); Hu, New Financial Products,
supra note 7, at 1308 ("Empirical studies pertaining to the effects of 'conglomerate mergers' tend
to suggest that such corporate-level efforts at minimizing exposure to unsystematic risk will de-
press the share price."); see also supra note 7.
104. See supra note 62.
105. See DOHERTY, supra note 41, at 16 ("Thus use of value maximization implies that cor-
porate decisionmakers will seek to maximize the size of the firm's future-earnings stream and/or
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indicates that the corporation's financing decisions should have no im-
pact on the firm's expected cash flows, that theory, and the other fi-
nancial theories discussed above, depend on a variety of limiting
assumptions that do not hold up in the real world. Once these as-
sumptions are relaxed, it becomes obvious that the failure of a corpo-
ration to hedge firm-level risk can have a significant negative impact
on the firm's expected cash flows and, correspondingly, on share-
holder wealth.
1. Most Firm-Level Hedging Reduces Unsystematic Risk
Investment portfolio diversification by individual investors elimi-
nates only unsystematic risk.'0 6 Commentators who argue that firm-
level hedging provides no benefit to diversified shareholders thus im-
plicitly assume that most firm-level hedging reduces unsystematic
risk.1"7 Other commentators make this statement explicitly.0 8
It is not obvious, however, that most derivatives hedging is aimed
at reducing unsystematic risk.109 Although the risks that most firms
hedge against may affect each firm differently, this does not necessar-
ily mean that these risks are unsystematic. 1'0 Although systematic
risk affects all firms and cannot be eliminated through diversification,
systematic risk does not affect all firms equally."' This is illustrated
by the fact that different firms have different betas. Some firms have
betas above one (meaning that they are more sensitive to systematic
risk than is the market as a whole) and others have betas less than one
(meaning that they are less sensitive to systematic risk than is the mar-
ket as a whole).' 12 By holding a fully diversified investment portfolio,
an investor can reduce beta toward one (the market portfolio's beta),
but can never completely eliminate it.113
minimize its level of risk."). The Modigliani-Miller assumptions include: perfect capital mar-
kets, perfect information, zero transaction costs, infinitely divisible assets, rational investors and,
initially, the absence of corporate taxes. See VAN HORNE, supra note 43, at 255-56.
106. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 7.
108. See, e.g., Hu, New Financial Products, supra note 7, at 1307 ("Many of the risks that
modern hedging products are designed to deal with are, at least to some extent, unsystematic
risks."); Stout, supra note 7, at 56 n.14 ("[M]uch, if not most, derivatives hedging involves alpha
risk.").
109. See SMITHSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 508 (stating that "some evidence is beginning to
suggest that risk management may actually have an impact on the firm's beta"); cf DOHERTY,
supra note 41, at 159, 259-60 (presenting empirical evidence that hedging firm-level risk by insur-
ing against loss may decrease systematic risk).
110. But see Stout, supra note 7, at 56 n.14 ("The observation that many of the variables
derivatives users hedge against.., have different effects on different firms suggests that much, if
not most, derivatives hedging involves alpha risk."). Professor Stout also argues that if firms
were in fact hedging systematic risk, then the premiums charged on derivative hedges would be
much higher than those currently observed. See id.
111. See VAN HORNE, supra note 43, at 64-65 (discussing systematic risk).
112. See id. at 66 tbl.3-1 (listing betas for sample of firms as of June 1996, ranging from 0.40
to 2.10).
113. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 62, at 162.
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There are many reasons to believe that much, if not most, deriva-
tives hedging alters systematic, rather than unsystematic risk. Recent
studies have presented empirical evidence that derivatives hedging
can reduce a firm's beta.1 4 This is not surprising, given that some of
the most widely used derivatives hedges are interest-rate and cur-
rency-based.1 1 5 Interest-rate risk and foreign-exchange risk are each
systematic market-wide phenomena that cannot easily be eliminated
by investors through holding a diversified investment portfolio. 116
Under the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem, therefore, firms can
benefit their shareholders by hedging such risk if the firm can hedge
more cheaply or effectively than shareholders themselves.
There are several reasons to believe that corporations have an
advantage over individual investors in hedging systematic risk. First,
although individual investors can directly hedge some systematic risk
through, for example, the purchase of exchange-traded financial fu-
tures and options," 7 individuals are generally not able to participate
in the over-the-counter derivatives market.118 Some specialized
hedges available to the corporate entity thus are not available to the
individual investor. Furthermore, the transaction costs of derivatives
hedging may be lower for the corporation than for the individual due
to economies of scale. 19 Finally, the corporation has an informational
advantage over its shareholders when hedging systematic risk because
the firm is more aware of its financial exposures and hedging needs
than are the firm's shareholders. 20 Because the corporation can
hedge systematic risk with derivatives more effectively and cheaply
than shareholders themselves, corporate management can enhance
shareholder wealth by hedging systematic risk.
114. See SMrrHSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 508-09; cf DOHERTY, supra note 41, at 159,
259-60 (presenting empirical evidence that insuring against firm-level loss may reduce systematic
risk).
115. See GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 40, at 55-57 tbls.2-5 (showing that there are higher
outstanding notional amounts of interest rate and currency derivatives than of derivatives based
on many other common underlyings); SMrM-ISON ET AL., supra note 63, at 52 (stating that "recent
growth in both exchange-traded and OTC derivatives in the past five years has been dominated
by the growth of interest rate products"); id. at 54-55 tbls.3-3, 3-4 (showing that the outstanding
notional principal amount of currency swaps is much larger than the combined outstanding no-
tional amounts of commodity (energy and metal) swaps and options).
116. See SMrrIHSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 508 (discussing empirical study showing connec-
tion between foreign exchange risk and beta); Bluford Putnam, Managing Interest Rate Risk: An
Introduction to Financial Futures and Options, in REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE FINANCE 239,241
(Joel M. Stern & Donald H. Chew, Jr. eds., 1986) (explaining that interest rate risk is
systematic).
117. See Froot et al., supra note 4, at 1630; Romano, supra note 9, at 36.
118. See Krawiec, supra note 2, at 10 (explaining that individual investors normally do not
participate in over-the-counter forward and swap activity).
119. See DUFFIE, supra note 41, at 230; Romano, supra note 9, at 36; infra notes 258-59 and
accompanying text (discussing transactional and informational economies of scale in derivatives
hedging).
120. See DUFFIE, supra note 41, at 230; Romano, supra note 9, at 36.
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To the extent that corporate-level derivatives hedging reduces
systematic risk, the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem thus indi-
cates that corporate management can enhance shareholder wealth by
hedging systematic risk at the firm level. Some hedges, however, ap-
pear to be attempts to reduce unsystematic, rather than market, risk
and cannot be explained through this rationale.1 21 There must, there-
fore, be some other explanation for why firms hedge those unsys-
tematic risks.
2. Transaction Costs
The Modigliani-Miller theorem makes an assumption of no trans-
action costs. 122 If, therefore, transaction costs do exist and can be re-
duced through derivatives hedging, then hedging will increase the
firm's expected cash flows, enhancing shareholder wealth.
a. Bankruptcy Costs
One type of transaction cost is the cost associated with bank-
ruptcy.123 Direct costs of bankruptcy include legal and administrative
costs and the possibility that assets may have to be liquidated at below
fair market value. 124 Because the direct costs of bankruptcy are less
than proportional to firm size, small firms face the greatest direct costs
in the event of bankruptcy. 125 These direct costs of bankruptcy, how-
ever, are small in relation to the value of most firms and would not,
alone, provide a legitimate rationale for corporate hedging, even for
most small firms. 12 6
There are also indirect costs associated with operating a firm that
is nearing bankruptcy, such as the increased costs of contracting with
the firm's risk-averse stakeholders, and these indirect costs can be
substantial. 27 Even considering that there may be large indirect costs
associated with bankruptcy, however, preventing bankruptcy costs can
provide only a partial explanation of firm-level derivatives hedging
121. Some commodity hedges, for example pork belly or wheat futures, presumably affect
systematic risk only minimally, if at all. Such hedging, however, may represent attempts to gain
cost-effective alternatives to vertical integration. See infra notes 215-26 (Part III.B.5) (discussing
derivatives hedging as a low-cost alternative to vertical integration).
122. See VAN HORNE, supra note 43, at 255; Miller & Modigliani, Dividend Policy, supra
note 68, at 412.
123. See SMrTSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 105-06.
124. See VAN HORNE, supra note 43, at 266.
125. See CLIFFORD W. SMITH, JR. ET AL., MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK 369 (1990); Deana R.
Nance et al., On the Determinants of Corporate Hedging, 48 J. FIN. 267, 269 (1993). Small firms,
however, also face the greatest transaction costs in derivatives hedging and thus do not hedge as
frequently as do large firms. See infra notes 256-61 (Part IV.A.1) and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the impact of firm size on derivatives hedging levels).
126. See DOHERTY, supra note 41, at 273-74; SMITH ET AL., supra note 125, at 369.
127. See VAN HORNE, supra note 43, at 267; infra notes 129-77 (Part III.B.2.b) and accom-
panying text (discussing risk premiums imposed by a financially distressed firm's risk-averse
stakeholders).
No. 4]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
because many firms that are unlikely to have serious concerns about
bankruptcy still hedge with derivatives.128 Prevention of bankruptcy
costs thus cannot fully explain why firms hedge.
b. Costs of Contracting with the Firm's Risk-Averse
Stakeholders
Another type of transaction cost is the cost of contracting with
the firm's risk-averse stakeholders. Expected future cash flows can be
increased through derivatives hedging because decreasing the firm's
total risk decreases the firm's costs of contracting. The corporation is
often referred to as a "nexus of contracts," with employees, managers,
suppliers, and others. 129 Each of these parties who contract, implicitly
or explicitly, with the firm demands a risk premium to compensate for
the riskiness of the contract. 130 The riskiness of the contract does not
necessarily depend on the likelihood of bankruptcy because corporate
layoffs and customer and supplier anxiety frequently occur in the ab-
sence of a bankruptcy threat. Risk-averse stakeholders who contract
with the firm will impose these costs whenever the firm is perceived as
risky, financially unstable, or prone to financial distress, even if that
perception is misguided. Hedging can thus act as a signaling device,
alerting stakeholders that the corporation is financially solid.131
Because nonhedging firms must remain competitive (in terms of
expenses and earnings) with other firms, there is a limit to the amount
of the risk premium that a firm can afford to pay. When the risk pre-
mium offered by the firm no longer adequately compensates for the
risk of doing business with the enterprise, the firm's undiversified
stakeholders exit the firm.132 When risk-averse stakeholders exit a
firm, the firm, and therefore the shareholders, must incur costs to re-
place them. These costs include hiring and training new personnel,
embarking on advertising campaigns to attract new customers, and re-
placing distributors, suppliers and other outside contractors that may
have terminated relationships with the firm. Each of these costs re-
duce cash flows and competitiveness and consequently reduce the
value of the firm as an ongoing enterprise.133
128. See Romano, supra note 9, at 37 (arguing that many corporate hedgers are not seri-
ously concerned with bankruptcy).
129. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 47, at 311.
130. See DOHERTY, supra note 41, at 21; David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, On the Corpo-
rate Demand for Insurance, 55 J. Bus. 281, 284 (1982).
131. Because corporate disclosure of hedging practices is often poor and, even if accurate,
may not be fully understood by investors, this signaling effect will most likely occur through the
firm's stable earnings pattern rather than through the direct disclosure of hedging practices in
the firm's financial reports. See Krawiec, supra note 2, at 49-50 (discussing the traditionally poor
corporate disclosure of derivatives use); infra notes 247-48 and accompanying text (same).
132. See Shapiro & Titman, supra note 31, at 220.
133. See id. at 221.
1062 [Vol. 1998
DERIVATIVES HEDGING
i. Employees
The relationship between the firm and its employees, including
management, is governed by the employment contract. Although the
specifics of the contract will be governed by many factors, including
supply and demand, the perceived riskiness of the contract also plays
an important role.134 As previously discussed, managers and employ-
ees are generally not well diversified and are, therefore, rationally risk
averse.'35 This is especially true for older workers who may have lim-
ited opportunities for subsequent rehire by another firm, and during
recessionary periods when employment opportunities may be scarce
for workers of all ages.136 If the employee perceives employment with
the firm to be risky in terms of security of employment or on-the-job
injury, she will require a risk premium as inducement to accept the
job.137
The risk premium may come in the form of demands for higher
wages that reduce the firm's cash flows.'3 8 The risk premium may also
be reflected through other risk-reducing contractual devices such as
layoff compensation, golden parachutes, special disability provisions,
and similar employee protection mechanisms. 139 The cost outlay by
the firm when one of these contractual devices is invoked will reduce
the firm's cash flows. Furthermore, the transaction costs involved in
creating, interpreting, and enforcing these special contractual provi-
sions (bargaining, legal drafting, and perhaps, litigation) will also re-
duce the firm's expected future cash flows. Firms that are unable or
refuse to pay a risk premium through either higher wages or addi-
tional contractual protections will be uncompetitive in attracting and
retaining the most qualified labor, again reducing corporate cash
floWS. 1 4 0
Employee turnover, particularly in upper management, occa-
sioned by financial instability in the corporation can be very costly to
the firm's shareholders. Empirical studies show that top management
turnover is substantially higher at firms with weak financial perform-
ance. 141 Although management turnover is also higher at firms near-
134. See DOHERTY, supra note 41, at 274; Shapiro & Titman, supra note 31, at 220.
135. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
136. See DOHERTY, supra note 41, at 274.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 20-21.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See Eugene P. H. Furtado & Vijay Karan, Causes, Consequences, and Shareholder
Wealth Effects of Management Turnover: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, J. FIN. MGMT.,
Summer 1990, at 60, 61 (reviewing studies of CEO turnover); Jerold B. Warner et al., Stock
Prices and Top Management Changes, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 461, 463 (1988) (presenting study of "top
management" departure, defined as CEO, president, and chairman of the board). Of course
many top management departures due to weak firm performance are not voluntary. Many stud-
ies do not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary departures and, in fact, it is generally
difficult to determine from departure announcements whether the departure is voluntary or
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ing bankruptcy, severe financial distress of this sort is not necessary
for increased management turnover to take place. 142  Studies have
found, for example, that firms are more likely to change CEOs follow-
ing four or more years of declining profits and that there is an inverse
relationship between stock price performance and CEO turnover.143
Of course when poor firm performance is due to mismanage-
ment, management departure is healthy for the firm. Because firm
performance is often a noisy indicator of management performance,
however, top management performance tends to be difficult to evalu-
ate. 44 As a result, when a firm suffers financial loss due to a failure to
hedge firm-level risk rather than due to mismanagement, the firm may
experience forced management departure due to "scapegoating," or
voluntary management departure due to management attempts to
protect its reputation. 145
Although empirical studies have produced conflicting results, it
appears likely that such departures of competent management can be
costly to the firm.' 46 For example, if the departing manager has firm-
specific skills or knowledge, if adequate replacements for the depart-
ing manager are scarce, or if contracting costs are high for other rea-
sons, then the departure should negatively affect firm value. 147 This
appears to be supported by empirical evidence that firms experiencing
voluntary management departures suffer significant negative abnor-
mal returns.148
In addition to the costs suffered by firms on the departure of
competent management, some firms may suffer losses from the depar-
ture of other employees as well. For example, the contracting costs
forced. See id. at 469-70. For purposes of this paper the difference is unimportant. Poor firm
performance leads to management departure, whether voluntary or forced, and when this depar-
ture is caused by forces other than mismanagement, the loss is costly to the firm.
142. See Furtado & Karan, supra note 141, at 61.
143. See id. at 61-62; Warner et al., supra note 141, at 487.
144. See Furtado & Karan, supra note 141, at 62; Warner et al., supra note 141, at 464. The
noise inherent in firm performance itself provides another rationale for firm hedging: firm hedg-
ing eliminates much of the noise in firm performance, allowing shareholders to more easily ob-
serve management competence. See Romano, supra note 9, at 37-38. This can reduce
monitoring costs and allow shareholders to replace inefficient management while retaining those
that are competent. It also makes the incentive compensation devices typically used to align
management and shareholder interests more effective. See infra notes 212-14 (Part III.B.4.c)
and accompanying text (discussing the value of derivatives hedging as a means of reducing
agency costs).
145. See Furtado & Karan, supra note 141, at 62.
146. See id. at 68. These conflicting results could be due to the failure of most studies to
distinguish between forced and voluntary departures. See id. at 69-70. Alternatively, the mixed
results could be due to the mixed signals that a management departure sends to the marketplace.
For example, the change may signal that management performance and firm outlook are worse
than what the market had priced for, or the change could signal the replacement of inefficient
management, the departure of good management from a deteriorating firm, a shift in investment
policy, or any number of other signals. See id. at 69; Warner et al., supra note 141, at 466.
147. See Furtado & Karan, supra note 141, at 69.
148. See id. at 71 (discussing several such studies).
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incurred in the replacement of firm-specific human capital are much
greater than those incurred in the replacement of general human capi-
tal.149 Firms that use specialized labor or spend large resources on
employee education and training thus have larger contracting costs
and will suffer larger losses due to employee turnover.' 50 The costs
from such a lack of continuity in personnel are particularly high for
firms whose value derives primarily from intangible, rather than tangi-
ble, assets. Such intangible assets may include the firm's reputation,
service and product quality, and knowledgeable personnel. These
costs from employee departure are particularly high in corporations
with valuable intangible assets because high personnel turnover often
results in reduced product and service quality, harm to product devel-
opment and marketing, and loss of touch with the firm's customer
base.15' In addition, many firms operate in industries that require
salespersons to develop a relationship with customers. For example,
medical, computer, and equipment salespersons, stockbrokers, and in-
vestment bankers, to name just a few, often develop such relationships
with customers. Financial distress may cause these employees to
move to a less risky firm, taking customers with them.152
ii. Customers
The firm also has "contracts" with its customers. Because finan-
cial distress creates incentives for firms to produce lower quality prod-
ucts, 153 customers will demand a risk premium before purchasing
goods from a firm believed to be financially unstable. 154 This is partic-
ularly true for purchasers of credence goods-goods the quality of
which is very important but difficult to determine ex ante, such as air-
line travel and medications.'55 Airlines believed to be in danger of
financial distress, for example, have been further damaged by custom-
ers unwilling to fly due to fears that the risky airline will cut corners
on safety.156
149. See id. at 69. The replacement of general human capital is assumed to be zero when
contracting costs are zero and thus to have no effect on firm value. See id. Contracting costs,
however, are never really zero, and there is always some cost involved in identifying and hiring a
new employee. Nonetheless, these costs are very small in comparison to the costs of replacing
firm-specific human capital.
150. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 125, at 370.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text (discussing incentives for financially dis-
tressed firms to reduce expenditures in certain areas, including the provision of high-quality
products and services).
154. See SMITHsoN ET AL., supra note 63, at 107 illus.4-2 ("[T]he biggest challenge any mar-
keter can face [is] selling the products of a company that is on the ropes." (quoting the Wall
Street Journal)); Shapiro & Titman, supra note 31, at 217.
155. See SMITHSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 107; Shapiro & Titman, supra note 31, at 222.
156. See Shapiro & Titman, supra note 31, at 222.
No. 4]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
Customers may also charge a premium to compensate for the
perceived danger that a risky company may go out of business. This is
particularly true if the goods or services offered by the company re-
quire service contracts, warranties, upgrades, or other future perform-
ance by the firm or by after-market sales and service providers. 157 For
example, customers will not purchase insurance from a company per-
ceived to be at risk of financial distress unless premiums are suffi-
ciently low to compensate for this risk.158
Many companies, such as car and computer manufacturers, de-
pend on services and compatible products produced by after-market
providers. The appearance of financial stability can encourage these
third parties to invest the time and capital necessary to form this type
of synergistic relationship. 159 For example, software providers first
market programs compatible with computers that command the larg-
est market share.16°
Recognizing the importance of these types of relationships, cus-
tomers are reluctant to do business with a firm that has not attracted
sufficient after-market providers or with firms that may be at risk of
losing after-market providers due to real or perceived financial insta-
bility. This is because, if the original producer goes out of business,
the demand volume for complementary products and replacement
parts decreases, causing reduced economies of scale in production and
making those replacement or complementary parts and products more
expensive and difficult to obtain.161 Similarly, fewer service providers
will find it worthwhile to become trained and knowledgeable about
the product once it is no longer being produced. 162 Any owner of a
rare foreign car who has broken down in a strange area of the country
and faced the difficulty of locating a mechanic and spare parts on
short notice knows this phenomenon well. 6 3
For example, auto purchasers, fearing lack of performance on af-
ter-sale service contracts, appear to have reacted negatively to
Chrysler Corporation's financial distress in the late 1970s and early
1980s. The company was forced to compensate with various incen-
tives as a risk premium." As Lee Iacocca stated when asked about
Chrysler's financial difficulties:
Our situation was unique .... It wasn't like the cereal business.
If Kellogg's were known to be going out of business, nobody
would say: 'Well, I won't buy their cornflakes today. What if I
157. See DOHERTY, supra note 41, at 21; SMITHSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 106.
158. See DOHERTY, supra note 41, at 21.
159. See Shapiro & Titman, supra note 31, at 222.
160. See id. at 218.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See DOHERTY, supra note 41, at 21; Shapiro & Titman, supra note 31, at 217-18.
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get stuck with a box of cereal and there's nobody around to ser-
vice it?" 165
These problems are also common in the computer industry.'66
Customers of such an expensive item that will require service and up-
grades or hardware and software in the future naturally prefer to do
business with a well-known company whose future existence is more
assured than with a more risky, unknown firm.' 67 IBM exploits this
fear through advertising: "What most people want from a computer
company is a good night's sleep." '168
Firms that act as suppliers, rather than as direct retailers, are also
hurt by total risk. Because firms need to be assured of a stable supply
source, they will avoid suppliers whose future viability appears risky.
When Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation filed for bankruptcy in
1985, for example, the company was forced to substantially reduce
prices to attract customers, most of whom reduced or eliminated or-
ders with Pittsburgh Steel.16 9 This risk aversion is most pronounced
when there are substantial costs involved in substituting suppliers
("switching costs"). These costs may arise, for example, from the
need to learn the operation of new systems, software, machinery or
equipment, and when other products or equipment must be modified
or replaced to ensure compatibility with the product. 7 °
iii. Suppliers
Finally, the firm's suppliers also charge a risk premium. If a firm
is perceived as risky, suppliers may trade with that firm only on less
beneficial terms, saving the most sought after contractual terms for
their preferred customers. For example, suppliers may refuse to ex-
tend trade credit to a firm perceived to be at risk of financial dis-
tress. 171 These demands for cash payments are particularly costly
because they are likely to come at a time when the firm is already
strapped for cash. Other "premia" exacted by suppliers may include
165. Walter Guzzardit Jr., The Two lacoccas, FORTUNE, Nov. 26, 1984, at 221, 224.
166. See SMITHSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 107 illus.4-2; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 47,
at 341-47; Shapiro & Titman, supra note 31, at 218.
167. See SMITHSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 107 illus. 4-2 (stating that "customers ... want
to be sure that their suppliers.., will be around to fix bugs and upgrade computers for years to
come" (quoting the Wall Street Journal)); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 47, at 341-42; Shapiro
& Titman, supra note 31, at 218.
168. Shapiro & Titman, supra note 31, at 218. This is illustrated by the experience of the
computer company Wang, whose leverage at one point raised earnings volatility considerably.
Consistent with the theories espoused in this section, Wang's sales fell. See SMITHSON ET AL.,
supra note 63, at 107 illus.4-2. A customer who decided not to purchase from Wang explained
her decision this way: "[B]efore the really bad news, we were looking at Wang fairly seriously
[but] their present financial condition means that I'd have a hard time convincing the vice presi-
dent in charge of purchasing .... At some point we'd have to ask 'How do we know that in
three years you won't be in Chapter 11?"' Id.
169. See Shapiro & Titman, supra note 31, at 218.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 219.
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refusals to invest in the development or supply of goods or services
designed particularly for the risky customer, or the provision of infer-
ior service and delivery schedules. 172 Actions such as these make it
more difficult for the firm to acquire the goods and services it needs
(particularly specialized goods and services) and further reduces the
firm's ability to compete with industry rivals. This, in turn, decreases
firm profits and makes financial distress more likely.173  The risk
premia imposed by suppliers will be particularly costly for firms that
require customized goods and services from their suppliers and for
firms that have fewer sources of supply. 1
74
iv. Conclusion
Financial instability reduces confidence in the firm, making the
long-term investment of either human or financial capital in the firm
less valuable and causing the imposition of costly risk premia or an
exodus of the firm's undiversified stakeholders. When risk-averse
stakeholders exit a firm, the firm (and therefore the shareholders)
must incur costs to replace them. These costs include hiring and train-
ing new personnel, embarking on advertising campaigns to attract new
customers, and replacing distributors, suppliers and other outside con-
tractors that may have terminated relationships with the firm. Each of
these expenditures decreases cash flows and reduces the value of the
firm as an ongoing enterprise. 175 The danger of financial distress thus
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: as stakeholders exit the firm due to
fears of financial distress, the firm's cash flows are reduced, making
financial distress more likely.
All of a firm's contracts thus tend to adjust for total risk, through
either a risk premium or termination. 176 The degree of risk aversion
of the parties, supply and demand, and the relative bargaining
strength of the parties will all determine the level of adjustment.
These adjustments reduce the corporation's expected cash flows,
which in turn are impounded in share price in an efficient market. 177
172. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 125, at 370; Shapiro & Titman, supra note 31, at 218-19.
173. See Shapiro & Titman, supra note 31, at 218-19. The problem with risk-averse supply
sources will be most severe during times of supply shortage, when all firms must struggle for
needed resources. See id.
174. See CLIFFORD W. SMITH, JR. ET AL., Five Reasons Why Companies Should Manage
Risk, in THE HANDBOOK OF CURRENCY AND INTEREST RATE RISK MANAGEMENT 19-11 (Rob-
ert J. Schwartz & Clifford W. Smith, Jr. eds., 1990).
175. See Shapiro & Titman, supra note 31, at 221.
176. Perfect adjustments, of course, require perfect markets. In an imperfect market, there
is likely to be a mispricing of some risk. Employees and other corporate stakeholders, for exam-
ple, may not have full knowledge of a firm's risk management policies. See DOHERTY, supra
note 41, at 23. As previously discussed, however, corporate stakeholders are likely to observe
the financial stability that results from corporate hedging. See supra note 131. It is thus the
firm's stable earnings pattern, rather than the direct observation of firm hedging activity, that
acts as a signal to corporate stakeholders.
177. See id. at 21.
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The converse is also true: activities that reduce the firm's total risk
reduce the risk premium required by other corporate stakeholders.
This increases the firm's cash flows and share price. The shareholders
have thus benefitted from actions that reduce the total risk of the firm,
but not because they directly benefit from reduced total risk. As cor-
rectly noted by commentators criticizing corporate derivatives hedg-
ing, a reduction in unsystematic risk does not alter the discount rate
used by diversified shareholders. Rather, the increase arises because
the cash flows included in the numerator of the net present value
equation have increased, not because the discount rate contained in
the denominator of that equation has decreased.
3. The Firm's Investment Policies
Modigliani and Miller assumed that firms have unlimited access
to external financing and that the firm's investment policy, therefore,
remains fixed.178 If, in fact, the firm's investment policy fluctuates
with cash flows, then stabilizing the firm's cash flows through hedging
can have a positive impact on the firm's investment policies. This in-
creased investment, in turn, can result in increased expected future
cash flows. To illustrate, if a firm does not hedge, it will experience
some amount of variance in its net cash flows. This must result in
either a reduction in investment or an increase in externally generated
funds. A reduction in investment normally is not desirable for a com-
pany with positive growth opportunities. A decrease in net cash flow
need not result in decreased investment, however, if the firm is willing
and able to replace the lost cash flows through the external capital
markets. If corporate management was willing to replace lost internal
cash flows with external financing, the firm could simply leave its fi-
nancial exposures unhedged and correct any shortfalls in cash flow
through an increase in external funds.'7 9
Evidence indicates, however, that management does not replace
all lost internal cash flows with external funding. This managerial re-
luctance to rely on the external capital markets may be attributable to
costs associated with external funding.180 The costs of external financ-
ing include direct costs, such as the issuance costs associated with a
new bond or equity offering, as well as indirect costs, such as the in-
creased probability of bankruptcy and financial distress (if debt is
raised), or from negative signals to the marketplace (if equity is
raised). 18'
178. See Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Asymmetric Information and the New
Theory of the Firm: Financial Constraints and Risk Behavior, 80 AM. ECON. REv. 160, 160
(1990); Miller & Modigliani, Dividend Policy, supra note 68, at 424.
179. See Froot et al., supra note 4, at 1630.
180. See id. at 1633.
181. See id. at 1633-34. Equity issuances are generally considered to signal negative infor-
mation to the marketplace, such as that the firm's equity is overvalued or that the firm is not
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On the other hand, management's reluctance to rely on the exter-
nal capital markets may be due to factors other than cost. For exam-
ple, managers may be reluctant to raise external funds due to the
increased monitoring that takes place when management is forced to
enter the capital markets. Alternative explanations more favorable to
management are that management nearly always regards its shares as
undervalued or may feel that recourse to the capital markets will be
perceived as mismanagement or misjudgment of the firm's financial
requirements. 82 In addition, there is evidence that the costs associ-
ated with external funds may be more than offset by benefits to share-
holders and much financial literature indicates that the costs of
internally generated funds may exceed the costs associated with exter-
nally generated funds.'83 Regardless of whether external funds are
more expensive than internal funds, if management prefers internal
funds and is reluctant to enter the external capital markets, it will not
seek outside funding and will not invest at an optimal level, leading to
reduced cash flows and potential market share loss. 184 There is sub-
stantial empirical evidence that managers prefer to rely on internally
generated funds and that investment levels are, in fact, impacted by
variance in cash flow levels.185
financially stable enough to issue more debt. See VAN HORNE, supra note 43, at 275-76. This is
supported by empirical evidence of positive abnormal returns to shareholders around the time of
debt issuance announcements and negative abnormal returns to shareholders around the time of
announcements of equity issuances. See id. at 276; see also Greenwald & Stiglitz, supra note 178,
at 160 (1990) ("If information is asymmetrically distributed between the buyers and sellers of
financial instruments, then certain financial markets, such as that for equities, may break down
... and accordingly the free access to all forms of financing envisaged by Modigliani-Miller may
not exist.").
182. See GORDON DONALDSON, MANAGING CORPORATE WEALTH 54-56 (1984). One very
notable exception to this common tendency of management to feel that its corporation's shares
are undervalued at any price is Warren Buffett, the Chairman of Berkshire Hathaway. Mr. Buf-
fett stated in connection with a recent offering of Berkshire Hathaway shares that he did not
believe that Berkshire stock was undervalued at the then-current price and that he personally
would not purchase stock of Berkshire at that price. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Introduc-
tion to Warren E. Buffett, The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for Corporate America, 19
CARDOZO L. REV. 5, 20 (Lawrence A. Cunningham ed., 1997).
183. Management's preference for internal over external cash flows is central to Jensen's
"free cash flow" theory. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate
Finance and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323-25 (1986). Under this theory, the use of the
corporation's free cash flow (that is, all excess cash flow that cannot be reinvested by the firm at
a rate at least equal to the company's cost of capital) is a frequent source of tension between
management and shareholders. Shareholder wealth is maximized if management pays out to the
shareholders all corporate funds that cannot be reinvested by the firm at the cost of capital.
Management, however, prefers to retain free cash flow. See id. (explaining that management
likes to retain internal cash flows in order to enhance its own wealth, power or stability); supra
note 182 and accompanying text (discussing potential reasons for management's preference for
internal financing). In addition, if management pays out all excess funds, it will be forced to
enter the external capital markets when additional funding is needed. This subjects management
to greater marketplace monitoring and is believed to further enhance shareholder wealth. See
Jensen, supra this note at 323-25.
184. See Froot et al., supra note 4, at 1634.
185. See, e.g., DONALDSON, supra note 182, at 46-47 (arguing that managers prefer internal
funds); Froot et al., supra note 4, at 1635 (explaining that investment levels are impacted by
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As discussed, customers, suppliers, and employees may be reluc-
tant to do business with a firm perceived to be at risk of financial
distress.186 This perception, therefore, even if false, may cause a firm
to suffer a disruption in its trading patterns. 187 A disruption in the
firm's trading patterns is likely to cause a reduction in cash flows, low-
ering the present value of the shareholders' investment.1 88 More im-
portantly, unless replaced by external funds, the decreased corporate
expenditures and negative publicity associated with a disruption of
trading may result in an industry restructuring, leading to a permanent
loss of market share for the risky corporation.'89
Firms facing cash flow and liquidity problems, for example, may
be inclined to allow product and service quality to decline and to cut
back on research and development, marketing efforts and expendi-
tures, inventory, or any other area where cutbacks are not visible in
the short term but are likely to harm the firm in the long run.1 90 In a
severely distressed firm, even if that distress is short-lived and does
not ultimately lead to bankruptcy, the normal incentives that en-
courage management to maximize the long-term profitability of the
firm are no longer compelling. Other stakeholders in the company,
recognizing these dangers, become less willing to do business with the
firm, further reducing cash flows and market share.19'
The amount of potential market share loss is related to the type
of industry in which the corporation operates. In highly competitive
industries, challengers may take advantage of the corporation's finan-
cial distress through predatory pricing, increased expansion, and other
attempts to lure customers and seize market share. Practices such as
these may make it difficult for the firm to recover and may even lead
to its permanent collapse. 192
Ample empirical and anecdotal evidence of this phenomenon can
be found from the leveraged restructurings of the late 1980s. While
the highly leveraged companies needed all excess cash flow to cover
interest and debt payments, their competitors could use excess inter-
nal funds to expand production or distribution facilities or to cut
internal cash flow); Greenwald & Stiglitz, supra note 178, at 163 (demonstrating that research
investment and productivity growth are impacted by internal cash flow).
186. See supra notes 129-77 (Part III.B.2.b) and accompanying text (discussing the reactions
of customers, suppliers, and employees to firms perceived to be at risk of financial distress).
187. See DOHERTY, supra note 41, at 401; Shapiro & Titman, supra note 31, at 216.
188. See Shapiro & Titman, supra note 31, at 216.
189. See DOHERTY, supra note 41, at 401. The importance of market share to a firm's profit-
ability should not be underestimated. See Buffett, supra note 182, at 77 (discussing the impor-
tance of Coca-Cola's 44% and Gillette's 60% world market shares).
190. See Shapiro & Titman, supra note 31, at 217. The firm may also be tempted to allow
workplace conditions and employee benefits to deteriorate, harming the firm's reputation and
ability to attract qualified personnel in the future. See id.
191. See id.
192. See DOHERTY, supra note 41, at 405.
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prices193 For example, when several major players in the supermar-
ket industry underwent restructurings that resulted in highly lever-
aged capital structures, nonleveraged rivals profited at their leveraged
competitors' expense. Nonleveraged Albertson's, for example, could
underprice its highly leveraged competitors such as American Stores,
Ralph's, and Vons. At the same time, Albertson's doubled its rate of
new store expansion. Its leveraged rivals, which needed excess cash
flow to repay debt, could not compete. 194 Furthermore, nonleveraged
supermarket companies profited from lower borrowing and leasing
costs and from the ability to outperform their leveraged rivals in terms
of customer service, employee compensation and retention, and re-
modeling and upgrading of stores.' 95 As a result, nonleveraged super-
market companies were able to capture market share from their
leveraged competitors, resulting in important market share shifts.196
Similar events took place in the retail clothing, paper products, and
tobacco industries. 97
A similar decrease in investment and subsequent market share
loss can occur when a firm suffers financial losses due to an economic
event, such as energy price or interest rate fluctuations, that its com-
petitors have hedged against. Unless willing and able to turn to exter-
nal sources of funding, the firm will not have the spare cash to
compete against opportunistically timed expansions and price wars.
4. Agency Costs
Agency costs literature indicates that when the Modigliani-Miller
assumptions of perfect information and costless contracts are relaxed,
hedging can reduce agency costs and increase the firm's cash flows.
193. See Norm Alster, One Man's Poison .... (Who Benefits from Leveraged Buyouts),
FORBES, Oct. 16, 1989, at 38-39.
194. See id. This anecdotal evidence in the supermarket industry is supported by empirical
evidence. Several studies show that supermarket industry firms that had not recently undergone
a leveraged restructuring experienced positive abnormal returns when their competitors under-
went leveraged buy-outs, and that competitors tended to "prey" on leveraged rivals through
price cuts and store expansion. Judith A. Chevalier, Capital Structure and Product-Market Com-
petition: Empirical Evidence from the Supermarket Industry, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 415, 433
(1995); Judith A. Chevalier, Do LBO Supermarkets Charge More? An Empirical Analysis of the
Effects of LBOs on Supermarket Pricing, 50 J. FIN. 1095 (1995).
195. See Alster, supra note 193, at 39.
196. See id. For example, nonleveraged Giant Food Inc. was able to increase its market
share in the Washington, D.C. area from 43% to 48% in three years due largely to expansion at
the expense of leveraged competitors. See id.
197. See id. (discussing market share shifts in the retail clothing and paper products indus-
tries); BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE 511 (1990) (noting that
after the Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR) buyout of RJR Nabisco, Phillip Morris expanded its
sales force, cut prices, and developed new product lines, increasing its market share lead over
RJR Nabisco by seven to eight percentage points).
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a. Agency Costs Associated with Debt
A firm facing immediate cash flow problems is more likely to
make decisions that maximize short-term cash flows at the expense of
long-term value.' 98 This includes decisions that impair the firm's long-
term credit reputation. Under normal circumstances, a firm that ex-
pects to continue operations in the future will take care to protect its
credit reputation in the realization that it will be benefitted by cheaper
interest rates in the future. A sterling reputation with creditors, how-
ever, is less valuable to a firm facing immediate cash flow problems.1 99
Such firms are thus more likely than financially stable firms to take
actions that harm creditors and transfer wealth from bondholders to
shareholders.
These wealth transfers may include switching to more risky assets
that increase creditor risk. To illustrate, Black and Scholes argued
that the option pricing model they developed could be used to analyze
the shareholders' equity claim as a call option on the entire firm.z°°
Equity can thus be valued as an option to repurchase the firm from
the bondholders at the maturity date of the debt issue.2 01  Because
option value increases with variance in the underlying asset, reference
rate or index, the stockholders of financially distressed firms have an
incentive to switch to risky projects.02 This incentive is exacerbated
in financially distressed firms due to the "underinvestment
problem. "203
Recognizing that risky firms entail greater agency costs, creditors
will pass those costs on to shareholders in various ways.20 4 These costs
198. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
199. See Shapiro & Titman, supra note 31, at 219.
200. See Fisher Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81
J. POL. ECON. 637, 649-50 (1973).
201. See id.
202. See SMITHSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 108; see also Krawiec, supra note 2, at 11 & n.87
(demonstrating that option value increases with increased variance in the underlying).
203. Traditional finance theory dictates that to maximize firm value, a corporation should
accept all positive net present value projects. See VAN HORNE, supra note 43, at 273. During
periods of financial distress, however, shareholders have an incentive to cause the firm to reject
some positive net present value projects the benefits of which accrue primarily to bondholders.
See Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131, 134-35 (1989);
Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147, 149 (1977). Finan-
cial distress leads to the underinvestment problem because as the borrower's equity cushion
decreases, a greater portion of the benefits of any positive net present value project accrue to the
lender. See Fischel, supra, at 134-35. For example, consider a firm with a net asset value of $100,
aggregate outstanding debt equal to $100 and an investment opportunity with an expected return
of $20. Because the firm's equity cushion is equal to the amount of debt outstanding, any in-
creased value accrues to the shareholders and there is an incentive to accept the project. Now
suppose the firm's net asset value drops to $50. Because the entire $20 from the project would
accrue to the bondholders, the shareholders have an incentive to forgo the project and instead
either pay out any excess funds as a dividend or seek an investment with a higher expected
return and correspondingly higher risk. See id. For a more elaborate example illustrating the
underinvestment phenomenon, see SMITHSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 110-12.
204. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 47, at 342 (demonstrating that these agency costs
are ultimately borne by the shareholders).
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may include higher interest rates that increase the firm's cost of capi-
tal and more restrictive lending terms.2 °5 Restrictive lending terms
allow the firm less flexibility and freedom in operations and invest-
ments and can prove especially costly to high-growth firms with many
opportunities for profitable reinvestment. a 6 Decreasing total risk can
thus provide firms not only with lower funding costs, but also with less
restrictive debt covenants, leading to increased future cash flows and
greater shareholder wealth.
The agency costs associated with debt are thus exacerbated by
financial distress.2 °7 Because hedging decreases variance in the firm's
earnings and makes default less likely, hedging can reduce the agency
costs associated with the differing investment objectives of sharehold-
ers and creditors. 20 8 Because this shareholder-creditor conflict is a
greater problem for firms with more debt in their capital structure and
for firms with more positive net present value investment opportuni-
ties, the shareholders of more leveraged firms and of firms with more
growth options should benefit the most from firm-level hedging.20 9
b. Relationship with Leverage
Because leverage increases the probability of financial distress
and hedging decreases that probability, firm-level hedging allows the
use of more debt in the firm's capital structure. a 0 If there are benefits
to having leverage in the firm's capital structure due, for example, to
taxes or the reduction of agency costs associated with free cash flow,
then hedging provides a benefit to shareholders by increasing debt
capacity.21' Firms with greater leverage in their capital structures,
205. See DOHERTY, supra note 41, at 21; Nance et al., supra note 125, at 269-70; Shapiro &
Titman, supra note 31, at 219-20.
206. See SMITHSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 108; Shapiro & Titman, supra note 31, at 219-
20.
207. See Fischel, supra note 203, at 134-35.
208. See Hendrik Bessembinder, Forward Contracts and Firm Value: Investment Incentive
and Contracting Effects, 26 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 519, 531 (1991); Shehzad L.
Mian, Evidence on Corporate Hedging Policy, 31 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 419, 422
(1996); Nance et al., supra note 125, at 270.
209. See Nance et al., supra note 125, at 270.
210. See Froot et al., supra note 4, at 1632. For example, both Kaiser and Kohlberg Kravis
Roberts (KKR) have used derivatives to increase debt capacity. See SMITHSON ET AL., supra
note 63, at 109, illus.4-3.
211. See Froot et al., supra note 4, at 1632. Miller has argued that, given both personal and
corporate taxes, capital structure is irrelevant to firm value. Miller, supra note 68, at 267-68.
Others disagree, however. See, e.g., VAN HORNE, supra note 43, at 265-66 ("My own view is that
... there is a tax advantage to borrowing for the typical corporation."). Free cash flow has been
described as "cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net
present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital." See Jensen, supra note 183, at
323. The use of free cash flow is a frequent source of tension between management and share-
holders. Principles of corporate finance dictate that management should pay out all excess cash
flow that cannot be reinvested at the cost of capital. Management, however, likes to retain free
cash flow in order to enhance its own wealth, power or stability. The use of debt in the capital
structure forces management to pay out some portion of free cash flow in the form of interest
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therefore, may have greater hedging incentives consistent with share-
holder wealth maximization than relatively unleveraged firms.
c. Noise Reduction
Another potential benefit of corporate hedging is that it elimi-
nates much of the "noise" in firm performance caused by extraneous
events, allowing shareholders to more easily observe management
competence.212 This reduced noise can decrease monitoring costs and
allow shareholders to replace inefficient management while retaining
those who are competent. Furthermore, hedging increases the effec-
tiveness of the incentive compensation devices typically used to re-
duce agency costs and align shareholder and management interests.213
To the extent that management is compensated through incentive pro-
grams that depend on firm performance, hedging thus ensures that
management is rewarded (or penalized) only for its own skill (or in-
competence) rather than for extraneous events that may affect firm
performance.2 1 4
5. Vertical Integration
Some firms may hedge in an attempt to assure a stable and af-
fordable supply or output source. For these firms, hedging may pro-
duce some of the same wealth enhancement effects as vertical
integration-an acquisition or other business combination between
two parties in a buyer-seller relationship.21 For example, the Metro-
politan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) and the state of
Delaware both use derivatives to lock in or cap fuel costs. 216 Simi-
larly, Ametek, a manufacturer of precision tools and electric motors,
employs commodity hedges to lock in prices on nickel and copper be-
cause both metals are widely used in the corporation's manufacturing
operations.21 7 The hedging motivations of each of these firms are sim-
ilar to those of the downstream partner in a vertical combination. In
other words, these corporate hedgers seek to ensure a reliable supply
and principal payments, thus reducing the agency costs associated with free cash flow. See id. at
323-25.
212. See Romano, supra note 9, at 37-38.
213. See id. at 38.
214. See id.
215. Although commentators seem to agree that vertical integration can create efficiency
benefits for the combined firms, there is substantial debate as to the existence and degree of
potential anticompetitive effects on the marketplace. See Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Verti-
cal Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA L. REV. 143, 146-47 (1997) (discussing the
evolution in judicial views on the economic effects of vertical mergers); Michael H. Riordan &
Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 513,
513-14 (1995); see also id. at 515 n.15 (listing law and economics articles analyzing anticompeti-
tive issues in vertical mergers).
216. See GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 40, at 39.
217. See THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, STRATEGIC FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT
196-97 (1993).
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or "input" market, as does the downstream partner in a vertical
merger.
Other firms may hedge in order to attain a reliable "output"
source. For example, a gold or oil producer may sell forward con-
tracts if its management believes that gold or oil prices will decline in
the future. The hedging motivations of these firms are thus similar to
those of the upstream partner in a vertical combination. For these
types of firms, hedging may produce some of the same wealth en-
hancement effects as vertical integration, such as providing an assured
source of supply or output at predictable prices.218 For example, verti-
cal integration can reduce the transaction costs of contracting for both
the upstream and downstream firms in a vertical combination. These
costs include negotiation with new partners, legal drafting and en-
forcement, potential information asymmetries between the con-
tracting parties, and the possibility that contracting partners will
behave opportunistically. 219 Firms may also vertically integrate to im-
prove coordination in product design and production,22 ° or to avoid
the costs of market failure associated with procuring goods, services,
or market access externally.221
There are also potential costs to vertical integration, however, in-
cluding the diseconomies of scale that often result when an enterprise
becomes too large and complex.222 In addition, upstream firms may
lose some customers after a vertical combination if those customers
are competitors of the downstream firm that is the merger partner.223
Finally, the creation of a captive customer may cause some postcom-
bination upstream firms to become uncompetitive in the absence of
market incentives.224
218. See Riordan & Salop, supra note 215, at 522.
219. See Meese, supra note 215, at 168. Derivatives hedging in the exchange-traded market
may provide these same reductions in transaction costs due to the standardization, price-trans-
parency, and fungibility of exchange-traded contracts, combined with the fact that the
counterparty to such contracts is the exchange clearinghouse itself, rather than another deriva-
tives dealer or end-user. See Krawiec, supra note 2, at 46 (discussing standardization and fungi-
bility of exchange-traded derivatives); id. at 32 (explaining that the exchange clearinghouse is
the counterparty on all exchange-traded derivatives contracts); id. at 30 (discussing price-trans-
parency of exchange-traded derivatives market).
220. See Riordan & Salop, supra note 215, at 523-24.
221. See Meese, supra note 215, at 185-86; Riordan & Salop, supra note 215, at 524-25. For
example, manufacturers that do not engage in their own distribution efforts but instead rely on
the market to distribute their products leave to the discretion of dealers and retailers many
decisions regarding product marketing. See Meese, supra note 215, at 165. Because dealer mar-
keting efforts are a collective good, some dealers may free-ride on another's marketing efforts,
meaning that these marketing efforts tend to be underprovided. See id. This market failure can
be avoided by vertical integration, as well as by other methods. See id. at 185-86 (arguing that
vertical integration, exclusive dealer territories, and minimum price restrictions are each meth-
ods by which this type of market failure can be avoided).
222. See GiLSON & BLACK, supra note 72, at 276.
223. See id.
224. See id.
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Derivatives hedging, however, is not a perfect substitute for verti-
cal integration. There is no exchange-traded market, for example, in
some types of inputs and outputs. Such derivative contracts could
thus be attained only in the over-the-counter market at potentially
prohibitive cost.225 Furthermore, some benefits of vertical integration
may not be duplicated through derivatives hedging.226 Nonetheless,
by assuring a stable and affordable output or supply source for some
corporations, derivatives hedging may replicate some of the same pos-
itive shareholder wealth effects associated with vertical integration but
without the related costs.
6. The Impact of Hedging on Taxes
The irrelevance theorem as applied to derivatives hedging as-
sumes a world without taxes.2 27 If taxes do exist and are impacted by
hedging, then hedging will affect the firm's cash flows. If the tax
schedule is convex, firm-level hedging can reduce expected taxes.228
A convex tax schedule is one in which the marginal tax rate exceeds
the average tax rate.229 An increase in the progressivity of the tax rate
and tax preference items (such as tax loss carry forwards, investment
tax credits (ITCs) and similar tax benefits) leads to a more convex tax
schedule.23 ° Corporations with more pretax income in the progressive
region of the tax schedule and firms with more tax preference items
thus potentially may gain the most shareholder value from hedging.231
However, the portion of the U.S. corporate tax schedule that is pro-
gressive is relatively small and thus is not a major factor motivating
the hedging decisions of most corporations.232 Furthermore, many
225. See infra note 353 (discussing the costs involved in derivatives hedging and, in particu-
lar, the greater costs associated with over-the-counter, as opposed to exchange-traded,
derivatives).
226. For example, derivatives hedging is not likely to improve coordination in product de-
sign and development or avoid the costs associated with some types of market failure.
227. Although Modigliani and Miller initially assumed the absence of taxes in their theory
that capital structure is irrelevant to firm value, they later relaxed this assumption. See Modi-
gliani & Miller, Cost of Capital, supra note 5, at 272-73 (proposing the irrelevance theorem
under an assumption of the absence of taxes); Modigliani & Miller, Corporate Income Taxes,
supra note 68, at 433-34 (relaxing the assumption of no taxes and concluding that there may be a
substantial advantage to the use of debt in the corporation's capital structure); Miller, supra note
68, at 262 (arguing that, even in a world with corporate and personal taxes, capital structure is
irrelevant to firm value).
228. See SMITHsON ET AL., supra note 63, at 102; Nance et al., supra note 125, at 268.
229. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 174, at 19-9.
230. See SMrrH ET AL., supra note 174, at 19-9; Nance et al., supra note 125, at 268. For
example, under a progressive tax structure, an individual taxpayer with a total gross income of
$120,000 over a two-year period may have a lower tax burden if she earns $60,000 in each of
those two years than if she earns $120,000 in the first year and zero in the second. Because of
the higher marginal tax rate on the $120,000, the more stable earnings pattern of $60,000 per
year results in a lower tax burden.
231. See Nance et al., supra note 125, at 268.
232. See SMrsoN ET AL., supra note 63, at 105. For subchapter C corporations, the U.S.
tax rate is currently progressive for income up to $10 million. See 26 U.S.C. § 11(b) (1994). For
subchapter S corporations, where income normally passes through to the individual sharehold-
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large corporations that hedge do not have income in the progressive
portion of the tax schedule and do not have tax losses or ITCs.23 3 For
most public corporations, therefore, tax-based explanations do not
provide a workable rationale for the firm's hedging practices.
7. Shareholder Diversification
The argument against derivatives hedging assumes that share-
holders are diversified.23" While shareholders actually may be un-
diversified for several reasons, the presumption of shareholder
diversification is nonetheless not a serious weakness in the argument
against derivatives hedging.235 First, corporations that engage in de-
rivatives hedging are generally large and publicly held, rather than
closely held.236 Second, studies indicate that a large portion of pub-
licly traded shares in the United States are owned by institutional in-
vestors.237  Because institutional investors are generally well-
diversified, one can conclude that a large portion of public sharehold-
ers in the United States are, in fact, diversified.238 The assumption of
shareholder diversification thus is not a serious weakness in the argu-
ment against derivatives hedging.
ers, the tax implications of firm hedging depend primarily on the progressivity of the individual
tax rate. For individuals, the U.S. tax code is currently progressive for income up to $250,000
(for married couples filing jointly and single taxpayers). See 26 U.S.C. §§ 1(a)-(c). The alterna-
tive minimum tax also leads to greater tax schedule convexity. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 174,
at 19-9; SMITHSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 105.
233. See Romano, supra note 9, at 37.
234. Although even undiversified shareholders can hedge directly through the purchase of
exchange-traded options and futures, as previously discussed, this argument is unpersuasive be-
cause the firm can hedge with derivatives more effectively and cheaply than can shareholders
themselves. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
235. Owners of closely held corporations, in contrast to shareholders of publicly held corpo-
rations, tend to have a large portion of both their human and financial capital invested in one
firm and thus are not diversified. See SMITHSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 102. In addition, there
is rarely a market for close corporation shares, and there are often restrictions on the resale of
such stock, making the investment illiquid. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 72, at 318-19. As a
result, shareholders of close corporations generally are not well diversified and have not elimi-
nated unsystematic risk from their portfolios. Furthermore, some shareholders may be undiver-
sifted due to ignorance or legal restrictions. See Hu, Corporate Investment, supra note 7, at 365-
66; Hu, Hedging Expectations, supra note 7, at 45 n.223.
236. See infra notes 260-61 and accompanying text (noting that large firms hedge more than
small firms, due to transactional and informational economies of scale).
237. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520, 567-68
(1990) (discussing the high level of institutional ownership in U.S. corporations).
238. Moreover, even if some investors remain undiversified due to ignorance or legal con-
straints, the presumption of shareholder diversification may still be useful. See Hu, Corporate
Investment, supra note 7, at 293 n.32 ("[T]his [potential lack of diversification] does not neces-
sarily mean that one should avoid using this presumption."). Professor Hu argues that failures
by uninformed individual shareholders to diversify are more properly addressed through suita-
bility rules and public education than through changes in corporate investment policy. See id.
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IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the costs of a failure
to hedge are likely to be higher for some firms than for others. Firms
for which a failure to hedge is particularly costly may substantially
benefit their shareholders by reducing risk at the corporate level. The
foregoing materials thus not only demonstrate that firm-level risk re-
duction can have many benefits for the corporation's shareholders,
but also lay the foundation for constructing a profile of those firms
that should derive the greatest shareholder wealth benefits from hedg-
ing. This firm profile can then be compared to empirical evidence of
actual firm hedging behavior to determine whether the hedging be-
havior of corporations is most consistent with shareholder wealth
maximization or with some other motivation, such as managerialism.
The analysis in part III.B indicates that some firms may generate
shareholder wealth through the use of derivatives to reduce systematic
risk, substitute for vertical integration, or generate tax savings. The
shareholder benefits to be gained from firm-level derivatives hedging
are thus partly a function of the firm's need for such advantages, com-
bined with the firm's ability to profitably employ derivatives to cap-
ture these advantages. Part III.B also indicates that a firm in financial
distress, or a firm that is perceived by its creditors and risk-averse
stakeholders as being more susceptible to financial distress, will suffer
higher costs than will a firm that is, or is perceived to be, more stable.
The benefits to be gained from firm-level risk reduction are thus also a
function of: (1) the probability that a firm will encounter financial
distress or will be perceived by its creditors and risk averse stakehold-
ers as more likely to experience financial distress, and (2) the costs the
firm will incur if financial distress does occur or if stakeholders and
creditors do impose risk premia or additional agency costs due to the
perception of riskiness.239
The probability of financial distress is positively related both to
leverage and to the variance of a firm's earnings pattern.24 ° If the
hedging behavior of most firms is consistent with shareholder wealth
maximization, therefore, we should expect firms that have higher
earnings variance to hedge more frequently than firms with more sta-
ble earnings. Although we might also expect to observe more hedging
by firms that are leveraged, countervailing factors make such a predic-
tion problematic.24 1
The costs that a given firm will experience if it encounters finan-
cial distress or is perceived by its creditors and risk-averse stakehold-
ers as more likely to encounter financial distress depend on numerous
239. See Nance et al., supra note 125, at 269.
240. See SMrrIHSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 105-06.
241. See infra notes 268-78 (discussing the complex relationship between leverage and
hedging).
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factors, some of which have been empirically examined. Finally, hedg-
ing is only one of many means of reducing the likelihood of financial
distress and the agency costs associated with debt. Firms could, there-
fore, reduce the probability of financial distress by reducing the level
of debt in the firm's capital structure (perhaps financing with pre-
ferred stock instead),242 investing in less risky assets, purchasing liabil-
ity or property insurance, merging with another firm,24 3 or using on-
balance sheet hedging strategies.244 Similarly, the firm could reduce
the agency costs associated with debt through the use of convertible
bonds, more restrictive debt covenants or investment in less risky or
more liquid assets.245 Firms that employ one or more of these alterna-
tive strategies may, therefore, utilize derivatives hedging programs
less frequently than firms that do not use alternative agency cost or
risk reduction strategies.246
242. See Nance et al., supra note 125, at 270. Whereas the interest payments due on debt
are a fixed obligation, the dividends due on preferred stock are merely a preference. In other
words, common shareholders may not be paid a dividend until preferred shareholders have been
paid the dividend owed to them. Although the failure to make an interest payment on debt thus
constitutes a default that can lead to bankruptcy, a skipped dividend on preferred shares means
only that common shareholders may not receive a dividend. On the other hand, like debt, pre-
ferred stock is normally entitled only to a fixed payment and does not generally share in the
corporation's upside earning potential with the common shareholders. Preferred stock thus al-
lows common shareholders to raise funds without increasing the probability of bankruptcy and
without being forced to share the benefits of continued corporate growth.
243. See supra notes 89-102 (Part III.A) and accompanying text (discussing conglomerate
mergers).
244. See Nance et al., supra note 125, at 267, 270-71. To illustrate on-balance sheet hedging,
suppose that for the coming year a firm is subject to a risk of loss from an increase in gold prices.
The firm could hedge this risk through the purchase and storage of sufficient gold reserves to last
for one year. This strategy, however, is expensive as it involves a large initial cash outlay and
storage costs. The firm is more likely, therefore, to hedge its exposure to gold prices through the
use of off-balance sheet transactions, such as the purchase of a forward contract.
245. See SMn-HSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 108; Nance et al., supra note 125, at 270-71.
Convertible bonds may reduce the agency costs associated with debt by reducing the incentives
for shareholders to switch to riskier projects or underinvest, because the profits from such activi-
ties will ultimately be shared with convertible bondholders should firm value reach a level that
makes conversion profitable. See VAN HORNE, supra note 43, at 543; Jensen & Meckling, supra
note 47, at 354. Convertible bonds thus act to align the interests of shareholders and bondhold-
ers and reduce monitoring costs. See VAN HORNE, supra note 43, at 543; Jensen & Meckling,
supra note 47, at 354. Restrictive debt covenants can reduce the agency costs associated with
debt by limiting the opportunities for shareholder wealth transfers. See SMrr-soN ET AL., supra
note 63, at 108. This can be accomplished in a variety of ways, including by restricting dividends
and other distributions to equity owners, restricting the firm's allowable investments and provid-
ing standards relating to the firm's financial condition.
246. See Nance et al., supra note 125, at 271 (observing that convertible debt and preferred
stock may operate as substitutes for corporate hedging); Peter Tufano, Who Manages Risk? An
Empirical Examination of Risk Management Practices in the Gold Mining Industry, 51 J. FIN.
1097, 1107 (1996) (hypothesizing that diversification and cash balances may operate as substi-
tutes for corporate hedging). But see Christopher G6czy et al., Why Firms Use Currency Deriva-
tives, 52 J. FIN. 1323, 1329 (1997) (arguing that, because convertible debt and preferred stock are
additional leverage, financial theory predicts a positive relationship between corporate hedging
and the use of convertible debt or preferred stock in the corporation's capital structure rather
than the negative relationship predicted by many researchers).
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Empirical evidence as to the derivatives hedging practices of
firms has traditionally been difficult to obtain because public disclo-
sures were often poor and did not accurately distinguish between
hedging and purely speculative transactions.247 Most studies that have
attempted to evaluate the hedging practices of publicly traded corpo-
rations, therefore, have resorted to surveys.248 In at least some stud-
ies, many of the firms surveyed did not respond or did not respond
completely,249 causing problems with the reliability of the empirical
results. In others, the survey questions were not framed so as to elicit
the most useful responses. 250  Nonetheless, these studies can afford
some initial insight into the hedging practices and motivations of
firms, and the results have been included in this section.
In recent years, derivatives disclosures have improved greatly, al-
lowing more recent studies to analyze publicly reported data and
avoid the nonresponse bias and other empirical shortcomings of prior
studies.251  Even recent studies, however, present difficult empirical
problems. For example, there is significant correlation among vari-
ables252 and the predicted impact of some variables is mixed, depend-
247. See Walter Dolde, Hedging, Leverage, and Primitive Risk, J. FIN. ENGINEERING 187,
197 (1995) (discussing poor derivatives disclosure by nonfinancial firms and the difficulty in in-
terpreting the limited hedging data that is disclosed by such firms); Grczy et al., supra note 246,
at 1323 (stating that "empirical evidence on the characteristics of derivatives users is limited");
Mian, supra note 208, at 419 ("The lack of publicly available information on corporate hedging
activity severely limited previous empirical research in this area.").
248. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 125, at 376 (explaining that because public data on hedg-
ing techniques is limited "empirical studies have had to resort to surveys"); Henk Berkman &
Michael E. Bradbury, Empirical Evidence on the Corporate Use of Derivatives, 25 FIN. MGMT. 5,
5 & n.2 (1996) (using publicly available data from audited financial statements of 116 New Zea-
land firms, but noting that "earlier empirical research has used survey and field study data to
describe the corporate use of derivatives"); James R. Booth et al., Use of Interest Rate Futures by
Financial Institutions, 15 J. BANK RES. 15, 16 (1984) (using survey data); Dolde, supra note 247,
at 189 (1995) (same); Mian, supra note 208, at 419 (using publicly reported data but noting that
"previous empirical work on hedging has relied primarily on survey-based data"); Nance et al.,
supra note 125, at 271 (using survey data due to lack of publicly available derivatives
information).
249. See, e.g., Nance et al., supra note 125, at 271.
250. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 125, at 376.
251. See G6czy et al., supra note 246, at 1324 (using annual report disclosures); Mian, supra
note 208, at 420 (using publicly available derivatives data); Tufano, supra note 246, at 1098 (using
public reports of 50 firms in the gold mining industry). Despite the great improvements in deriv-
atives disclosure in recent years, most observers believe that substantial improvements are still
needed. See, e.g., Krawiec, supra note 2, at 61 (discussing studies and reports stressing the need
for improved derivatives disclosure and recent FASB proposals to improve derivatives account-
ing standards).
252. See Nance et al., supra note 125, at 275. See, e.g., infra notes 272-74 and accompanying
text (discussing the correlation among leverage, growth opportunities and hedging); infra notes
256-59 and accompanying text (discussing the correlations among taxes, firm size, and hedging).
Even multivariate analyses do not fully alleviate the problem of correlations among variables.
See, e.g., Jennifer Francis & Jens Stephan, Characteristics of Hedging Firms: An Empirical Ex-
amination, in ADVANCED STRATEGIES IN FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT 615, 629 (Robert J.
Schwartz & Clifford W. Smith, Jr. eds., 1993) (stating that "[t]he explanatory power of the [mul-
tivariate] models is less than 2 percent; this is not surprising given the correlations between the
proxy variables and the hedge decision variable").
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ing on the firm characteristic for which the variable is a proxy. 3
Furthermore, calculating an accurate and unbiased measure of deriva-
tive usage is problematic, even for firms that publicly report derivative
activity.2 54 Finally, many of the factors discussed in part III that may
enable firms to generate shareholder wealth through hedging remain
untested and are, perhaps, untestable.255
Despite these shortcomings, this article presents a compilation
and review of these studies in an attempt to draw preliminary conclu-
sions from the reported results. Specifically, although many questions
remain unanswered and further research is still needed, the empirical
evidence available to date is generally consistent with a shareholder
wealth maximization rationale.
A. Firm Characteristics Consistent with Shareholder
Wealth Motivated Hedging
1. Firm Size
The analysis in part III.B indicates that small firms have more
hedging incentives consistent with shareholder wealth maximization
than do large firms due to small firms' greater likelihood of undiversi-
fled shareholders, and income in the progressive region of the tax
code and their proportionally higher direct costs of bankruptcy. 6
One might, therefore, predict a negative relationship between firm
size and hedging activity, meaning that small firms should be more
likely to hedge than large firms. Such a prediction, however, is prob-
lematic for several reasons. First, the direct costs of bankruptcy are
small in relation to firm size and, therefore, are not likely to be a ma-
jor factor motivating hedging, even for small firms.257 Second, there
are significant economies of scale in the transaction costs of deriva-
253. See, e.g., infra notes 256-61 (Part IV.A.1) and accompanying text (discussing the pre-
dicted impact of firm size on hedging); infra notes 268-78 (Part IV.A.3) and accompanying text
(discussing the complex relationship between leverage and hedging).
254. See, e.g., Berkman & Bradbury, supra note 248, at 8-9 (discussing various shortcomings
of derivative usage measures).
255. For example, to this author's knowledge, no studies have empirically tested whether
firms producing goods that require after market sales or service, act as suppliers of goods involv-
ing "switching costs," require specialized goods or services in order to operate, have fewer
sources of supply, operate in highly competitive industries, use specialized labor, spend large
resources on employee education and training, derive value primarily from intangible assets,
operate in industries that require salespersons to develop relationships with customers, or are
not vertically integrated are more likely to hedge than are other firms. See supra notes 106-238
(Part III.B) and accompanying text (discussing firms most able to enhance shareholder wealth
through derivatives hedging).
256. See Nance et al., supra note 125, at 272-74 (stating that firms with income in the pro-
gressive region of the tax code are smaller); supra note 235 and accompanying text (explaining
that shareholders of close corporations are more likely to be undiversified); supra note 125 and
accompanying text (demonstrating that because the direct costs of bankruptcy are less than pro-
portional to firm size, small firms can benefit more from reductions in direct bankruptcy costs
than can large firms).
257. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing direct bankruptcy costs).
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tives, implying that it is less expensive for large firms to hedge with
derivatives than it is for smaller ones.258 In addition, there are infor-
mational economies of scale associated with derivatives, meaning that
large firms are more likely to employ managers with the knowledge
and experience to manage a derivatives hedging program.2 59
The available empirical evidence indicates that large firms, in
fact, are more likely to hedge than small firms.26 ° This positive empir-
ical relationship between firm size and hedging indicates that econo-
mies of scale outweigh the impacts of direct bankruptcy costs, tax
motivations, and undiversified shareholders on firms' hedging
policies.261
2. Income Volatility
The analysis in part III.B indicates that because firms with greater
earnings variance are more likely to experience financial distress,
hedging is most likely to benefit the shareholders of firms with more
volatile earnings patterns.262 If, therefore, corporate hedging policies
are consistent with a shareholder wealth maximization rationale, we
should expect to see a positive empirical relationship between hedging
and earnings variance, meaning that firms with more volatile earnings
should be more likely to hedge than firms with relatively stable earn-
ings. This theory was supported by an empirical study of the deriva-
tives hedging practices of banks and savings and loans (S&Ls)
conducted by Professor James R. Booth. Professor Booth found that
the S&Ls were much more likely to hedge than were the banks.263 He
concluded that one reason for this finding was that the S&Ls had a
higher probability of encountering financial distress than did the
banks, due to greater mismatches between the maturities of assets and
liabilities.264
258. See Nance et al., supra note 125, at 269. For example, it is generally not cost effective
for firms to hedge exposures of less than $5 to $10 million. See Mian, supra note 208, at 424.
259. See Mian, supra note 208, at 424; Nance et al., supra note 125, at 269.
260. See Berkman & Bradbury, supra note 248, at 9 (finding a significant positive empirical
relationship between firm size and hedging); Stanley B. Block & Timothy J. Gallagher, The Use
of Interest Rate Futures and Options by Corporate Financial Managers, 15 FIN. MGM-r. 73, 75
(1986) (same); Booth et al., supra note 248, at 17 (same); Dolde, supra note 247, at 191 ("All
empirical tests to date have found a significantly positive relationship between size and hedg-
ing."); Mian, supra note 208, at 429 (finding a positive relationship between firm size and hedg-
ing); Nance et al., supra note 125, at 274 (same).
261. See Mian, supra note 208, at 424.
262. See supra notes 239-41 and accompanying text (explaining that shareholders of firms
with relatively more volatile earnings patterns will be benefitted by firm-level hedging more than
shareholders of firms with more stable earnings). Firm level hedging can also be of greatest
benefit to the managers of such firms, implying that managerialist explanations may also moti-
vate the hedging practices of firms with high earnings variability. See supra notes 78-81 and
accompanying text (discussing management risk aversion).
263. See Booth et al., supra note 248, at 17.
264. See id. Another possible factor posited by the surveyors was that the S&Ls were larger.
See id.
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The results of a study conducted by Professor Deana R. Nance,
however, conflict with Professor Booth's findings. Professor Nance
found no difference in the volatilities of the pretax income of hedging
and nonhedging firms.265 She concluded that this result should be ex-
pected in any survey of ex-post income volatilities because a firm's
income volatility is reduced as it hedges.266 This would render the ex-
post income volatilities of hedgers and nonhedgers indistinguish-
able.267 Future studies, therefore, should attempt to study firms'
prehedging income volatility to determine whether corporate hedging
policies are consistent with shareholder wealth maximization.
3. Leverage
The analysis developed in part III.B predicts a strong positive re-
lationship between leverage and hedging. In other words, because
leverage increases both the likelihood of financial distress and the
agency costs associated with a firm perceived to have a high
probability of experiencing financial distress, leveraged firms should
be more likely to hedge than relatively unleveraged firms.268 Further-
more, because hedging decreases the likelihood of financial distress, it
allows the use of more leverage in the firm's capital structure, again
indicating a potential positive relationship between hedging and lever-
age.269 Many studies found this predicted positive relationship.27°
Interestingly, however, many other researchers have found no
significant relationship between leverage and hedging, contrary to the
predictions developed in part III.B.271 These unexpected results, how-
ever, could be due to countervailing factors that complicate the rela-
tionship between leverage and corporate hedging practices. For
example, the analysis in part III.B predicts that firms with more in-
vestment opportunities are more likely to hedge.272 Empirical evi-
265. See Nance et al., supra note 125, at 274-75.
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See supra notes 129-77 (Part III.B.2.b) and accompanying text; notes 178-97 (Part
III.B.3) and accompanying text (discussing the costs associated with financial distress); notes
198-209 (Part III.B.4.a) and accompanying text (discussing the agency costs associated with fi-
nancial distress).
269. See supra notes 210-11 (Part III.B.4.b) and accompanying text (explaining that hedging
allows the use of greater leverage in the firm's capital structure, generating potential tax savings
and reducing the agency costs associated with free cash flow).
270. See Dolde, supra note 247, at 206 (finding the predicted positive relationship after con-
trolling for primitive risk); Berkman & Bradbury, supra note 248, at 12-13 (finding the predicted
positive relationship); G6czy et al., supra note 246, at 1339 (same); Tufano, supra note 246, at
1118 (finding a slight positive relationship).
271. See Block & Gallagher, supra note 260, at 75 (finding no significant relationship be-
tween hedging and leverage); Mian, supra note 208, at 434 (same); Nance et al., supra note 125,
at 274 (same); Francis & Stephan, supra note 252, at 634 (finding no relationship between deriv-
ative hedging and leverage in multivariate tests, but some evidence of a positive relationship in
time series tests).
272. See supra notes 178-97 (Part III.B.3) and accompanying text.
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dence demonstrates that firms with more investment options also
employ less debt in their capital structure.273 Using leverage as a
proxy for the number of the firm's investment options, therefore,
leads to a predicted negative relationship between hedging and lever-
age, rather than the positive relationship predicted by many research-
ers. In other words, because firms with higher leverage have fewer
investment options, they may hedge less than relatively unleveraged
firms, not more.2 74 The connection between hedging and leverage is
thus more complex and indeterminate than anticipated.
In addition, both leverage and hedging are affected by primitive
risk levels. 5 Professor Walter Dolde reasoned that firms with higher
exposures to risk had incentives to forgo leverage and hedge more in
an attempt to control variance, implying a negative relationship be-
tween hedging and leverage for certain higher-risk firms rather than
the positive relationship predicted by most researchers. 76 He
presented evidence that, after controlling for primitive risk levels, the
statistically significant positive relationship predicted by the theoreti-
cal model did exist between hedging and leverage.277 A study by Pro-
fessor Shehzad L. Mian provided some support for this theory by
finding that hedgers issue more long-term debt than do nonhedgers.278
Therefore, while some empirical studies, particularly more recent and
complex ones, support the conclusion that leveraged firms hedge
more than relatively unleveraged ones, further research in this area
would be valuable. Specifically, studies controlling for the number of
available investment options, risk levels, and type of hedging activity
could shed more light on the apparently complex relationship between
leverage and hedging.
4. Other Factors Affecting the Likelihood of Financial Distress
The analysis in part III.B demonstrates that firm-level hedging
will be of greatest benefit to the shareholders of firms more likely (or
perceived to be more likely) to experience financial distress.279 In a
recent study of the gold mining industry, Professor Peter Tufano used
"cash costs" as a proxy for the likelihood of financial distress, on the
273. See Nance et al., supra note 125, at 274.
274. See id.
275. See Dolde, supra note 247, at 212. Professor Dolde defined primitive risk as the "stan-
dard deviation of the ratio of operating income before depreciation to book value of assets." Id.
at 199.
276. See id. at 212.
277. See id. at 188. A study by Professor Mian, although not controlling for risk, found that
interest-rate hedgers had higher leverage than did nonhedgers of interest rate risk, while cur-
rency-price hedgers had lower leverage than did noncurrency-price hedgers. See Mian, supra
note 208, at 436. Grouping these two types of hedgers into one category, Professor Mian con-
cluded, caused these two correlations to cancel each other out and lead to the finding of no
significant relationship between hedging and leverage common among such studies. See id.
278. See Mian, supra note 208, at 434.
279. See supra notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
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rationale that gold mining firms will experience financial distress
whenever the price of gold is less than cash costs. 280 If the hedging
behavior of gold mining firms is consistent with a shareholder wealth
maximization rationale, we should expect to see a positive empirical
relationship between cash costs and hedging-that is, firms with
greater cash costs should hedge more than firms with lower cash
costs. 281 Instead, Professor Tufano found no relationship between
cash costs and hedging, leading him to conclude that the empirical
evidence did not support the theory that firms in the gold mining in-
dustry hedge to avoid financial distress.282
Professor Tufano theorized, however, that avoidance of financial
distress may provide less of an incentive for hedging in the gold min-
ing industry than in other industries. Professor Tufano speculated that
the gold mining industry may be unique in that gold mines own tangi-
ble assets that require no after-market sales or service. Furthermore,
gold mining companies can halt production during times of financial
distress, resuming later at relatively low cost and no loss of franchise
value.283 If these characteristics are not present in other industries,
future studies may reach different results. Future researchers, there-
fore, should study the relationship in other industries between hedg-
ing and the probability of financial distress to determine whether the
positive relationship predicted by part III.B withstands empirical
testing.
5. Available Investment Opportunities
The analysis developed in part III.B predicts a positive relation-
ship between the number of available investment opportunities and
hedging for several reasons. First, a reduction in the firm's cash flows,
if not replaced in the external capital markets, is likely to cause reduc-
tions in investment.284 Thus hedging, by reducing the likelihood of an
unexpected reduction in cash flows, can be of greatest benefit to the
shareholders of firms that will need internal cash flow to take advan-
tage of investment and growth opportunities. Second, firms that do
elect to replace lost internal cash flows through the external capital
280. See Tufano, supra note 246, at 1106. Professor Tufano defined cash costs as the direct
and indirect costs of producing gold, excluding non-cash items such as depletion and deprecia-
tion. See id.
281. See id. at 1108.
282. See id. at 1117. This is generally supported by the research of Professors Francis and
Stephan, who found no support in univariate and multivariate tests for the hypothesis that firms
hedge in order to avoid bankruptcy, but found some support for that hypothesis in time series
tests. See Francis & Stephan, supra note 252, at 634. Professors Francis and Stephan used an
"Altman's Z-score" to test for the likelihood of bankruptcy. See id. at 624.
283. See Tufano, supra note 246, at 1117 n.21. See supra notes 186-92 and accompanying
text (discussing market share and franchise value loss during times of financial distress).
284. See supra notes 178-97 (Part III.B.3) and accompanying text (discussing the impact of
financial distress on the firm's investment policies).
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markets typically do so by issuing debt securities.285 Debt securities
frequently contain restrictive debt covenants that limit the investment
options of management. These restrictive debt covenants (and, conse-
quently, recourse to the external capital markets) will be most costly
for firms with many investment opportunities.286 We should thus ex-
pect to see more hedging by firms with many investment opportunities
than by firms with fewer growth options for whom recourse to the
debt markets is less burdensome. Finally, the underinvestment prob-
lem and the incentives for shareholders to switch to more risky assets
imply that the agency costs associated with debt are most severe in
firms with many investment opportunities.287 Because the agency
costs associated with debt are exacerbated by financial distress, firms
with many investment opportunities (and correspondingly high agency
costs) are likely to hedge firm-level risk in an attempt to avoid finan-
cial distress.
Several studies have attempted to evaluate the relationship be-
tween profitable growth opportunities and firm hedging practices.
Three studies used the firm's research and development (R&D) ex-
penditures as a proxy for the firm's investment opportunity set and
found a statistically significant positive relationship between high
R&D expenditures and hedging.288
Professor Mian used a different measure, the ratio of the firm's
market value to book value of total assets ("market-to-book ratio"),
as a proxy for the firm's investment opportunity set, on the assump-
tion that firms with more growth opportunities should have higher
market-to-book ratios than firms with fewer growth options.2 89 He,
therefore, predicted that firms with higher market-to-book ratios
should hedge more than firms with lower such ratios. Contrary to the
predictions of a shareholder wealth-based hedging strategy, Professor
Mian found no evidence that hedgers had higher market-to-book ra-
tios than nonhedgers.29 ° Professor Mian's results are contradicted by
the research of Professor Christopher Gdczy who found a statistically
significant positive relationship between hedging and market-to-book
ratio.29'
285. See DONALDSON, supra note 182, at 46-56 (noting that, when corporate management is
forced to raise external funds, it does so through debt, rather than equity). This managerial
preference for debt over equity may be due to the negative marketplace signals associated with
equity issuances. See supra note 181 (discussing the negative signals associated with equity issu-
ances). It may also stem from a common view among management that its firm's shares are
undervalued. See DONALDSON, supra note 182, at 54-56.
286. See Nance et al., supra note 125, at 269-70.
287. See supra notes 198-209 (Part III.B.4.a) and accompanying text (discussing the agency
costs associated with debt).
288. See Dolde, supra note 247, at 201; G6czy et al., supra note 246, at 1339; Nance et al.,
supra note 125, at 274.
289. See Mian, supra note 208, at 422.
290. See id. at 428.
291. See Gfczy et al., supra note 246, at 1338-39.
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Professors Hank Berkman and Michael E. Bradbury used the
firm's earnings-to-price ratio as a proxy for the investment opportu-
nity set, on the assumption that firms with high earnings relative to
price have more long-term growth prospects and, therefore, should be
more likely to hedge than firms with lower such ratios.292 Consistent
with their predictions, Professors Berkman and Bradbury found a sta-
tistically significant positive relationship between hedging and the
firm's earnings-to-price ratio.293
The level of industry regulation also affects a firm's investment
options and has been used in at least one study as a proxy for the
firm's investment opportunity set. Professor Mian theorized that
firms in regulated industries are likely to have less discretion over in-
vestment policies and, consequently, fewer investment options than
firms in unregulated industries.294  Firms in regulated industries
should thus have fewer hedging incentives and should hedge less than
firms in unregulated industries.295 Comparing regulated utilities with
firms in unregulated industries, Professor Mian found that regulated
utilities were less likely to hedge than firms in nonregulated industries,
consistent with a shareholder wealth-based hedging strategy. 96
Exploration expenditures and acquisition activity have also been
used as proxies for the investment opportunity set.29 7 Professor
Tufano, for example, used these proxies to test the gold mining indus-
try. Contrary to the predictions of a shareholder wealth-based hedg-
ing model, Professor Tufano found no relationship between
acquisition activity and hedging, and found a negative relationship be-
tween exploration expenditures and hedging.298 Professor Tufano
noted, however, that there were several potential explanations for this
observed negative relationship. For example, he hypothesized that
there may be an inverse relationship between gold prices and explora-
tion such that, when gold prices are low, firms hedge more and scale
back on exploration activity because finding new gold at such times is
less valuable.299 In addition, management expectations of future gold
292. See Berkman & Bradbury, supra note 248, at 10.
293. See id. at 12-13 (finding a statistically significant (at 10% level) positive relationship
between corporate hedging and the firm's earnings-to-price ratio when using fair value as the
measure of derivative usage, but not when using contract amount as the measure of derivative
usage).
294. See Mian, supra note 208, at 422.
295. See id.
296. See id. at 428.
297. See Tufano, supra note 246, at 1108. Professor Tufano defined acquisition activity as
the dollar value of attempted acquisitions over the most recent three year period. See id.
298. See id. at 1117. Both variables were scaled by firm value. See id.
299. See id. at 1117 n.23; see also Froot et al., supra note 4, at 1638 (stating that "a company
engaged in oil exploration and development will find that both its current cash flows (i.e., the net
revenues from its already developed fields) and the marginal product of additional investments
(i.e., expenditures on further exploration) decline when the price of oil falls. For such a com-
pany, hedging against oil price declines is less valuable-even without hedging, the supply of
internal funds tends to match the demand for funds.").
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prices may affect both hedging and exploration appropriations, such
that managers who expect rising gold prices may be likely to hedge
less and explore more.3"'
To summarize, the theoretical model developed in part III.B of
this article predicts a positive empirical relationship between the
firm's investment opportunity set and hedging, meaning that firms
with more investment options should be more likely to hedge than
firms with fewer investment opportunities. While the available empir-
ical evidence is generally supportive of this proposition, the actual re-
lationship between hedging and investment options depends on the
proxy used to represent the firm's opportunity set. For example, all
studies reviewed by this author using R&D expenditures to represent
the firm's opportunity set found a statistically significant positive rela-
tionship between hedging and the investment opportunity set, consis-
tent with the theoretical model. Studies using the firm's market-to-
book ratio to proxy for available investment opportunities, however,
produced mixed results: one study supported the theory that firms
with a relatively large number of investment options are more likely
to hedge firm-level risk than firms with fewer growth opportunities,
while another study did not support that theory. Two researchers also
used the firm's earnings-to-price ratio as a proxy for the investment
opportunity set and, consistent with a shareholder wealth-based hedg-
ing strategy, found a statistically significant positive relationship be-
tween hedging and the firm's earnings-to-price ratio. Another study
relied on the level of industry regulation as a proxy for the number of
available investment options and found the predicted positive rela-
tionship between investment opportunities and hedging. Finally, a
study of the gold mining industry used exploration expenditures and
acquisition activity to represent the firm's opportunity set and found
no statistically significant relationship between acquisition activity and
hedging, but found a negative relationship between exploration ex-
penditures and hedging. Both of these findings are contrary to the
predictions of the theoretical model. As discussed in section 6 below,
however, studies of the relationship between investment opportunities
and hedging may be of limited utility, regardless of which proxy is
used to represent the firm's investment opportunity set.
6. Internally Generated Cash Flows
Numerous studies have examined the empirical relationship be-
tween hedging and available investment opportunities on the theory
that firms with more investment options can generate greater share-
holder wealth through the reduction of firm-level risk and, therefore,
300. See Tufano, supra note 246, at 1117 n.23. Although Professor Tufano did not propose
an explanation for the lack of an observed relationship between acquisition activity and hedging,
it seems reasonable that both of these explanations could apply to acquisition activity as well.
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should be more likely to hedge than firms with fewer investment op-
tions. Other researchers have opined that such studies are of limited
utility because it is not solely the size of the firm's investment oppor-
tunity set that affects the need to hedge. Rather, the availability of
internally generated funds necessary to exploit those investment op-
portunities is also relevant. 30 1 Therefore, some researchers argue that
regardless of the proxy chosen to represent the firm's opportunity set,
a study of corporate hedging practices must include a measure of the
firm's internal cash flows in order to be useful.3 °2
Professor G6czy attempted to test the cash availability of firms on
the theory that firms with substantial excess cash flow would have
more cash on hand to take advantage of available investment oppor-
tunities and, consequently, had less need to hedge.30 3 This theory was
supported by empirical findings that firms with higher quick ratios
(the ratio of cash and short-term investments to current liabilities)
were less likely to hedge than firms with lower quick ratios.3" Profes-
sors Berkman and Bradbury attempted to study the same hypothesis
using a more sophisticated measure, however, and found no relation-
ship between firm hedging and the ability of firms to fund current
investment plans.3"5
The theory that firms hedge to preserve cash flows for future in-
vestment opportunities is also supported by individual survey answers.
For example, Merck has described one of the factors affecting its
hedging decisions as the "potential effect of cash flow volatility on our
ability to execute our strategic plan-particularly, to make invest-
ments in R&D that furnish the basis for future growth."'3 6 Similarly,
a Unocal executive noted that "one possible added value of hedging is
to continue on a capital program without funding and defunding."3 °7
To summarize, anecdotal evidence indicates that corporate man-
agement considers the preservation of internal cash flows to fund de-
sired investment activity an important factor motivating firm hedging.
The empirical evidence, however, is mixed with respect to the rela-
tionship between internal cash flows and hedging. Future empirical
research should explore this inconsistency.
301. See Berkman & Bradbury, supra note 248, at 7; Froot et al., supra note 4, at 1655
("Firms will want to hedge less, the more closely correlated are their cash flows with future
investment opportunities.").
302. See Berkman & Bradbury, supra note 248, at 7.
303. See G~czy et al., supra note 246, at 1339.
304. See id.
305. See Berkman & Bradbury, supra note 248, at 12-13 (using the ratio of asset growth to
cash flow as a proxy for the firm's ability to fund current investment projects).
306. See Froot et al., supra note 4, at 1652 (quoting Judy C. Lewent & A. John Kearney,
Identifying, Measuring and Hedging Currency Risk at Merck, CONTINENTAL BANK J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 1, 19-28 (1990)).
307. Froot et al., supra note 4, at 1652 (quoting from Matthew Burkhart, Shareholders Ap-
plaud Risk Management, CORP. FIN. (June/July 1992)).
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7. Production of Credence Goods
Credence goods are goods for which quality is important, but dif-
ficult to determine ex ante, such as airline travel and medications. 30 8
Because purchasers of credence goods are likely to charge a risk pre-
mium before dealing with a firm perceived as risky, producers of
credence goods are likely to derive greater shareholder benefits from
firm-level hedging than other firms.3 °9 We should expect, therefore,
to find that producers of credence goods are more likely to hedge than
firms that do not produce credence goods. This has been supported
by at least one empirical test.310 Because drawing definitive conclu-
sions based on a single study is difficult, further research is needed to
determine whether producers of credence goods are more likely to
hedge than other firms.
8. Information Asymmetries Between Potential Investors
and Management
The analysis in part III.B demonstrated that firms for which the
external capital markets are particularly costly can generate potential
shareholder wealth through firm-level hedging. Entrance to the exter-
nal capital markets is likely to be most costly to firms with greater
information asymmetries between potential investors and manage-
ment. 311 These firms thus have a greater incentive to hedge to de-
crease the probability of resorting to the external capital markets.312
Professor Mian theorized that there is likely to be greater information
asymmetries for firms with greater market values relative to book val-
ues (high "market-to-book ratios") and for firms in nonregulated in-
dustries.31 3 Professor Mian reasoned that these firms thus have the
greatest incentive to hedge. Accordingly, he predicted a negative re-
lationship between the level of industry regulation and hedging,
meaning that firms in regulated industries should be less likely to
hedge than firms in unregulated industries. He further predicted a
positive relationship between market-to-book ratio and hedging,
meaning that firms with higher market-to-book ratios should be more
likely to hedge than firms with lower such ratios.31 4 Although Profes-
sor Mian's research supported the predicted negative relationship be-
tween regulated firms and hedging, he also found a negative
relationship between market-to-book ratio and hedging rather than
308. See SMITHSTON ET AL., supra note 63, at 107; Shapiro & Titman, supra note 31, at 222.
309. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text (discussing credence goods).
310. See SMIH ET AL., supra note 125, at 377-78 (discussing one study that found a positive
statistical relationship between hedging and the production of credence goods).
311. See Mian, supra note 208, at 423; see supra notes 180-85 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing reasons for management's reluctance to enter the external capital markets, including
potential information asymmetries between corporate management and prospective investors).
312. See Mian, supra note 208, at 423.
313. See id.
314. See id.
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the positive relationship predicted by his theoretical model.315 Profes-
sor Mian's findings on market-to-book ratio, however, are contra-
dicted by the research of Professor G6czy and, to a lesser extent, by
the research of Professors Berkman and Bradbury. Both of these
studies found a statistically significant positive relationship between
hedging and market-to-book ratio.316
Professor G6czy also used the number of analysts following a
company as a proxy for informational asymmetry, on the theory that
fewer informational asymmetries between company insiders and po-
tential investors should exist for firms with a greater analyst following.
Professor G6czy thus predicted a negative relationship between hedg-
ing and analyst following, meaning that firms with a greater analyst
following should be less likely to hedge than firms without such a fol-
lowing. The prediction was not supported by the empirical results.317
The empirical research, therefore, is mixed with respect to the propo-
sition that firms with the greatest informational asymmetries between
management and potential investors are more likely to hedge than are
other firms.
9. Shareholder Diversification
The analysis in part III.B indicates that firms with undiversified
shareholders have greater hedging incentives consistent with share-
holder wealth maximization than firms with diversified shareholders
because undiversified shareholders have not eliminated unsystematic
risk from their investment portfolios.318 If, therefore, firm hedging
practices are consistent with shareholder wealth maximization, we
should observe a negative relationship between shareholder diversifi-
cation levels and corporate hedging, meaning that firms with undiver-
sified shareholders should be more likely to hedge than firms owned
by diversified investors. Studies of the impact of undiversified share-
holders on a firm's derivatives hedging policies are problematic, how-
ever, because firms with undiversified shareholders tend to be smaller
and, due to economies of scale, firm size greatly impacts the firm's
hedging decision.319
Studies that control for economies of scale or firm size, however,
have found the predicted negative relationship. For example, a study
of reinsurance practices (where the economies of scale affecting deriv-
315. See id. at 428.
316. See Berkman & Bradbury, supra note 248, at 12-13 (finding a statistically significant (at
10% level) positive relationship between corporate hedging and the firm's earnings to price ratio
when using fair value as the measure of derivative usage, but not when using contract amount as
the measure of derivative usage); G6czy et al., supra note 246, at 1338-39.
317. See Gdczy et al., supra note 246, at 1340.
318. See supra notes 234-38 (Part III.B.7) and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of
firm hedging when shareholders are undiversified).
319. See supra note 260 and accompanying text (citing studies finding that large firms are
more likely to hedge than small firms).
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atives hedging are less marked) found that insurance firms with less
diversified owners were more likely to reduce unsystematic risk than
were insurance companies owned by well-diversified stockholders.2 °
This finding is supported by a study of the derivatives hedging prac-
tices of firms in the gold-mining industry conducted by Professor
Tufano. Professor Tufano found that large block ownership by diver-
sified institutions was negatively correlated to firm hedging.32 1 The
available empirical evidence, therefore, generally supports the theory
that firms with undiversified shareholders are more likely to hedge
firm-level risk than firms owned by diversified investors.
10. Tax Schedule Convexity
The analysis in part III.B indicated that firms with a convex tax
schedule have more hedging incentives consistent with shareholder
wealth maximization than firms without convex tax schedules.322 If,
therefore, firm hedging practices are consistent with shareholder
wealth maximization, we might expect to observe a positive relation-
ship between hedging and tax schedule convexity, meaning that firms
with convex tax schedules should be more likely to hedge than firms
without convex tax schedules. The analysis in part III.B also indi-
cated, however, that countervailing factors make tax savings an un-
likely rationale for the hedging behavior of most firms.3 23 This is
reflected in the empirical evidence, which generally does not support
the theory that firms hedge to generate tax savings.
A progressive tax rate and tax preference items, such as tax cred-
its and tax loss carry forwards, lead to a more convex tax schedule.
324
Researchers evaluating the relationship between hedging and tax sav-
ings, therefore, have primarily studied these three variables. Of the
numerous empirical studies reviewed by this author, only the study by
Professor Nance found a significant positive relationship between tax
schedule progressivity and derivatives hedging. 325 Because Professor
320. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 125, at 377 (citing David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, On
the Corporate Demand for Insurance, 55 J. Bus. 281, 281-96 (1982)); Nance et al., supra note 125,
at 281 (same). This finding is weakly supported by the research of Professor Dolde who found
that, among firms that did hedge, smaller firms hedged more fully and frequently than did large
ones. Dolde, supra note 247, at 191, 201. The relationship, however, was not considered statisti-
cally significant. See id.
321. See Tufano, supra note 246, at 1119-20.
322. See supra notes 227-33 (Part III.B.6) and accompanying text (discussing the impact of
hedging on a firm's tax liability).
323. See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text (noting that tax-based explanations do
not provide a workable rationale for the hedging behavior of most firms).
324. See supra notes 227-33 (Part III.B.6) and accompanying text (discussing the potential
impact of hedging on a firm's tax liability).
325. See Nance et al., supra note 125, at 272. But see, e.g., Francis & Stephan, supra note
252, at 634 (finding no relationship in univariate and multivariate tests between derivatives hedg-
ing and the average tax rate, but finding some evidence of such a relationship in time series
tests); Mian, supra note 208, at 431 (finding a negative relationship between tax rate progressiv-
ity and hedging).
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Nance did not control for firm size, however, her results are question-
able.326 The empirical support with respect to tax credits is equally
weak. Only Professor Nance found a positive relationship between
investment tax credits (ITCs) and hedging, although Professor Mian
found a significant positive relationship between foreign tax credits
and hedging.327 The evidence in support of a positive empirical rela-
tionship between tax loss carry forwards and hedging is stronger, but
mixed.328
The empirical results, therefore, are generally not supportive of
the hypothesis that firms hedge to gain tax savings. These results may
be of limited utility, however, because the range of taxable income in
the progressive region of the tax schedule and the number of tax pref-
erence items may incorporate other variables that make drawing con-
clusions difficult.329  For example, firms with more income in the
progressive region are also smaller, and, due to economies of scale,
small firms hedge less than larger firms.33 ° Studies that do not scale
for size, therefore, are of questionable reliability. In addition, only
certain types of activities give rise to ITCs. There may be something
unique to these activities, other than the generation of ITCs, that af-
fects firm hedging.3 31 Finally, many large corporations that hedge do
not have income in the progressive portion of the tax schedule and do
not have tax losses or ITCs.3 32 Even if the empirical evidence were
supportive of tax-motivated hedging, therefore, tax-based explana-
tions would not reconcile the hedging activities of most firms with the
desire to maximize shareholder wealth.
326. See Nance et al., supra note 125, at 280.
327. See id. at 272 (finding a significant positive relationship between ITCs and hedging);
Mian, supra note 208, at 431 (finding a significant positive relationship between foreign tax cred-
its and hedging). Professor Mian theorized, however, that the observed positive empirical rela-
tionship between foreign tax credits and hedging could be due to a connection between foreign
operations and hedging, rather than to a connection between tax schedule convexity and hedg-
ing. The positive statistical correlation between foreign tax credits and hedging could thus indi-
cate an attempt by firms to hedge foreign-currency risk, rather than an attempt to gain tax
advantages. See id.
328. See Grczy et al., supra note 246, at 1338, 1340 (finding no relationship between tax loss
carry forwards and hedging); Mian, supra note 208, at 431 (same); Nance et al., supra note 125,
at 272 (same); Tufano, supra note 246, at 1109, 1117 (same). But see Berkman & Bradbury,
supra note 248, at 12 (finding a significant positive relationship between tax loss carry forwards
and hedging); Dolde, supra note 247, at 203 (same). Professor Mian posited that the lack of an
observed empirical relationship in his study between tax loss carry forwards and hedging could
be due to the fact that, while tax loss carry forwards are a good proxy for a low marginal tax rate,
they are a poor proxy for convexity of the tax schedule. See Mian, supra note 208, at 431 n.15.
329. See Nance et al., supra note 125, at 272-74. Even multivariate analyses do not fully
alleviate this cross-correlation problem. See, e.g., Francis & Stephan, supra note 252, at 629
(stating that "the explanatory power of the [multivariate] models is less than 2 percent; this is not
surprising given the correlations between the proxy variables and the hedge decision variable").
330. See Nance et al., supra note 125, at 272-74 (stating that firms with income in the pro-
gressive region of the tax code are smaller).
331. See id.
332. See Romano, supra note 9, at 37.
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B. Firm Characteristics Consistent with Managerial
Explanations for Hedging
If firms hedge to protect risk-averse managers, then we should
expect to see more hedging by firms whose managers own large stock
holdings than by firms whose managers own large option holdings.333
This is due to the fact that, because option value is increased with
greater volatility in stock value, managers with large option holdings
can personally benefit from greater volatility in the firm's stock price
and, therefore, have less incentive to hedge firm-level risk.3 34 This
hypothesis was tested by Professor Tufano and found to be supported
by the empirical evidence. The level of management's option owner-
ship was negatively correlated with firm hedging, while the level of
management stock ownership was positively correlated with firm
hedging.335 Professors Berkman and Bradbury, however, used direc-
tor stock ownership levels as a proxy for management diversification
and found very little support for this hypothesis.336 Similarly, Profes-
sor G6czy found no support for the hypothesis that firms hedge to
protect undiversified managers. 337 The empirical evidence, therefore,
is generally mixed with respect to the theory that firms hedge in order
to protect risk-averse managers.
C. Hedging Substitutes
Convertible debt, preferred stock, asset liquidity, and diversifying
mergers can each operate as a substitute for firm hedging.338 We
might, therefore, predict an inverse relationship between the use of
each of these devices and firm-level derivatives hedging. At least
three studies tested for a relationship between firm hedging levels and
the presence of convertible debt or preferred stock in the firm's capi-
tal structure and found none.33 9 Only Professor Gdczy attempted to
reconcile this empirical finding with the theoretical prediction. He
theorized that convertible debt and preferred stock could operate as
333. See Tufano, supra note 246, at 1119.
334. See Krawiec, supra note 2, at 19 n.87 (demonstrating that option value increases with
underlying volatility).
335. See Tufano, supra note 246, at 1118. This is in contrast to stock ownership by large
nonmanagement block holders (defined as shareholders that own more than 10% of the firm's
outstanding stock), which Professor Tufano found to be negatively correlated with firm hedging.
See id. at 1119-20. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for potential
management risk aversion, including high levels of stock ownership in the firm).
336. See Berkman & Bradbury, supra note 248, at 12-13 (finding a positive relationship (but
at slightly less than a 10% significance level) between director share ownership and hedging
when using fair value as a measure of derivative usage, but no relationship when using contract
amount as the measure of derivative usage).
337. See G6czy et al., supra note 246, at 1340.
338. See supra notes 242-46 or infra notes 341-46 and accompanying text (discussing hedging
substitutes).
339. See Berkman & Bradbury, supra note 248, at 12-13; G6czy et al., supra note 246, at
1334, 1336 (table); Nance et al., supra note 125, at 274.
No. 4]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
additional leverage, meaning that their greater use in a firm's capital
structure should result in more hedging, not less. 34" Another possible
explanation is that hedging is primarily employed for other purposes,
such as reducing the noise in firm performance, hedging systematic
risk, or substituting for vertical integration, not served by the use of
convertible debt or preferred stock in the firm's capital structure.
At least three studies have found that firms using derivatives to
hedge risk exposure have significantly less liquid assets than nonhedg-
ing firms, consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model.341
In addition, the retention by a firm of large cash balances relative to
current needs can operate as protection against potential financial dis-
tress and act as a substitute for hedging.342 We might expect, there-
fore, to see a negative relationship between large cash balances and
firm hedging, meaning that firms with large cash balances should be
less likely to hedge than firms with smaller cash balances. This theory
was supported by the research of Professor Tufano, who found that
firms that carry large cash balances relative to current needs are in
fact less likely to hedge than firms without such cash reserves.343
Professors Berkman and Bradbury also used the dividend payout ra-
tio, defined as dividends per share divided by earnings per share, to
proxy for firm liquidity levels, on the assumption that firms that pay
out a large portion of their income as dividends will have lower cash
reserves. Consistent with their predictions, they found a statistically
significant positive relationship between dividend payout rates and
derivatives hedging.344
Finally, because firms can diversify as a substitute for hedging, we
might expect to see a negative correlation between firm-level diversifi-
cation and hedging, meaning that less diversified firms should hedge
more than other firms.345 Professor Tufano used the percentage of
firm assets outside the gold mining industry as a proxy for firm-level
diversification and found no significant relationship with hedging.346
The empirical evidence is thus generally supportive of asset liquidity
340. See Gdczy et al., supra note 246, at 1329; supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text
(predicting a positive relationship between hedging and leverage).
341. See Berkman & Bradbury, supra note 248, at 12-13 & tbl.5 (defining liquidity as the
"log of current assets minus inventory over current liabilities"). Professors Berkman and Brad-
bury found the relationship between asset liquidity and firm hedging to be statistically significant
(at 5% level) when using fair value as the measure of derivative usage, but not when using
contract amount as the measure of derivative usage). See id.; Mian, supra note 208, at 434 (find-
ing that firms that hedge have lower liquidity levels); Nance et al., supra note 125, at 274 (using
the average of the firm's current ratio (i.e., current assets divided by current liabilities) over the
course of the study period as a proxy for asset liquidity and finding that firms that hedge have
less liquid assets).
342. See Tufano, supra note 246, at 1121.
343. See id.
344. See Berkman & Bradbury, supra note 248, at 12-13 (finding a statistically significant (at
10% level) positive relationship).
345. See Tufano, supra note 246, at 1112.
346. See id. at 1121.
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as a substitute for firm hedging, but not supportive of the use of con-
vertible debt, preferred stock, or firm-level diversification as hedging
substitutes. Further research, therefore, should seek to determine
whether there are special functions served by derivatives hedging that
are not equally served by convertible debt, preferred stock, or firm-
level diversification.
D. Summary of Findings
To summarize, although many questions remained unanswered
and further research is still needed, the available empirical evidence,
while mixed, generally supports the theory that corporate hedging
practices are consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. It
should be noted, however, that much of the empirical evidence is also
consistent with managerial-based motives for corporate hedging. For
example, some researchers found empirical support for the hypothesis
that managers with large option holdings, as opposed to large stock
holdings, can gain personally from greater variance in their firms'
earnings and that such firms, therefore, are less likely to hedge than
firms with managers having large stock holdings.347 Other research-
ers, however, found no support for this hypothesis.34 8 Furthermore,
some empirical evidence that is consistent with shareholder wealth
maximization, for example that firms with higher earnings variance or
that have a high probability of experiencing financial distress for other
reasons are more likely to hedge, is equally consistent with a manager-
ialist explanation for hedging. Finally, many of the factors discussed
in part III.B that may enable firms to generate shareholder wealth
through hedging remain untested and are, perhaps, untestable. For
example, to this author's knowledge, no studies have empirically
tested whether firms producing goods that require after market sales
or service; act as suppliers of goods involving "switching costs;" re-
quire specialized goods or services in order to operate; have fewer
sources of supply; operate in highly competitive industries; use spe-
cialized labor; spend large resources on employee education and train-
ing; derive value primarily from intangible assets; operate in industries
that require salespersons to develop relationships with customers; or
are not vertically integrated are more likely to hedge than are other
firms.
3 4 9
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE DECISIONMAKING
The analysis in part III.B indicates that there are numerous po-
tential benefits that may accrue to shareholders through firm level
347. See supra notes 333-35 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 336-37 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 103-238 (Part III.B) and accompanying text (discussing firms most able
to enhance shareholder wealth through derivatives hedging).
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hedging. Given these benefits, hedging can be analyzed, not as a mere
financing decision, but as an investment in firm stability. Conse-
quently, the decision of whether and how much to hedge can be ana-
lyzed as would any other investment decision. In other words, firms
should weigh the costs of hedging against the potential benefits of re-
ducing firm-level risk. The firm should hedge up to the point where
the cost of reducing additional risk is equal to the cost of forgoing
further risk reduction.35 °
The costs of hedging include direct costs, such as the premium
paid for the hedge, as well as forgone upside profit.351 There are also
indirect costs involved in hedging, including the hiring and training of
personnel knowledgeable about advanced financial instruments, the
purchase of computer equipment and software, and the often substan-
tial costs of monitoring the hedging program. 2 There are significant
transactional and informational economies of scale associated with
these costs, and the indirect costs tend to be higher for over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives than for exchange-traded derivatives. 3
350. See Shapiro & Titman, supra note 31, at 229. In this sense, the decision of whether to
hedge firm-level risk depends on whether the transaction costs associated with hedging are
greater than the transaction costs associated with variability in input or output prices. The fol-
lowing illustrative example was provided by Professor Paul Mahoney:
Assume that a company makes a simple product (widgets) using a single commodity (corn)
as an input. The price of corn varies; it is $1 per unit half of the time and $2 per unit half of
the time. It is only profitable to manufacture widgets when the price of corn is less than, say
$1.75. The firm thus has a choice. It could choose to operate half of the time and shut down
half of the time. Alternatively, it could (by incurring some transaction cost) enter into a
forward contract to buy corn at $1.50 per unit, and therefore operate all the time. If starting
up and shutting down periodically were costless, shareholders would prefer to do so rather
than incur the transaction cost associated with hedging. In most industries, however, there
are significant transaction costs associated with the start-and-stop production method be-
cause it would result in inefficient use of other inputs, such as labor, and other supplies, etc.
See e-mail message from Paul G. Mahoney, Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of
Law to Kimberly D. Krawiec, Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law (July 9,
1998) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review). Professor Tufano has theorized, how-
ever, that starting and stopping production in this manner may be relatively low-cost for firms in
the gold-mining industry. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
351. Because derivatives hedging reduces earnings variance, both corporate losses and prof-
its are reduced. See Krawiec, supra note 2, at 9. Just as an insurance purchaser pays a premium
to avoid the risk of loss, this forgone profit represents the price derivatives hedgers are willing to
pay to avoid what they consider to be unacceptable risk levels. See id. at 15 n.65. Lost upside
potential is a major factor that must be considered in any firm hedging decision. For example,
Professor Stephen Figlewski's survey of financial derivatives use by life insurance firms revealed
that 50% of the larger and 82% of the smaller derivatives nonusers surveyed listed "too much
return has to be given up for the amount of risk reduction that is possible" in response to a query
of their reasons for not using derivatives. See STEPHEN FIGLEWSKI, THE USE OF FINANCIAL
FUTURES AND OPTIONS BY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 6 (Solomon Bros. Ctr. for the Study of
Fin. Insts. Working Paper Series No. 469, 1988).
352. See Mian, supra note 208, at 424. Although there are costs associated with monitoring
the credit, legal and operational risk of a derivatives portfolio, the largest costs appear to be
associated with monitoring market risk. For a discussion of the methods, technology, and costs
involved in market risk management, see Krawiec, supra note 2, at 20-23.
353. The lower costs of monitoring an exchange-traded, as opposed to an OTC, derivatives
portfolio stem from various factors, including the greater liquidity of exchange-traded deriva-
tives due to their standardization and smaller contract size, their greater price transparency due
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There may also be less obvious costs of derivative hedging. For
example, the failure to acquire the technical and informational up-
grades necessary to hedge adequately and prudently has proven to be
an extraordinarily costly mistake for some firms.35 4 In addition, Pro-
fessor Lynn A. Stout has persuasively argued that the lack of financial
sophistication of many derivatives end-users may combine with the
"winner's curse" and lead hedgers to overestimate the benefits of
their hedging programs. 5
Finally, it should be remembered that derivative hedging is only
one of many means of reducing firm-level risk and the agency costs
associated with debt. Nonetheless, corporate management may deter-
mine that derivatives are one of the most effective and least expensive
of these methods. For example, firms can reduce the probability of
financial distress by reducing the level of debt in the firm's capital
structure, investing in less risky assets, purchasing liability or property
insurance, merging with another firm, or using on-balance sheet hedg-
ing strategies.35 6  However, diversifying acquisitions and on-balance
sheet hedging are each expensive methods of corporate risk reduction,
and a firm that reduces the leverage in its capital structure may gain a
reduced likelihood of financial distress, but it may lose tax advantages
and increase other agency costs in the process.357 Similarly, a firm
to an active trading market, their lower credit risk due to exchange-imposed credit enhance-
ments, and their relative structural simplicity as compared with OTC derivatives. See generally
Krawiec, supra note 2 (comparing OTC and exchange-traded derivatives).
354. See Krawiec, supra note 2, at 24-30 (discussing large derivatives losses by Gibson
Greetings Inc., Proctor & Gamble Company, and Orange County, California), 40-42 (discussing
large derivatives losses by Barings, plc).
355. See Stout, supra note 7, at 56 n.15.
356. See supra notes 242-45 and accompanying text (discussing hedging substitutes that re-
duce the likelihood of financial distress).
357. See supra notes 93-94, 99 and accompanying text (discussing the shareholder wealth
reduction effects of diversifying acquisitions); supra note 244 (discussing on-balance sheet hedg-
ing); supra notes 210-11 (Part III.B.4.b) and accompanying text (discussing the relationship be-
tween leverage and both taxes and agency costs).
The realization that diversifying acquisitions are an expensive means of reducing firm-level
risk is extremely important to the derivative hedging debate and helps resolve a recurring puzzle
in the corporate finance literature. Recall that in addition to the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance
theorem, it is primarily the empirical evidence of the wealth reducing effects of conglomerate
mergers that have led critics to question the shareholder benefits of derivative hedging. See
supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. Traditional corporate finance theory has often as-
sumed that, under the Modigliani-Miller theorem, the wealth reduction effects of diversifying
acquisitions must be attributable to the fact that diversified shareholders have already elimi-
nated systematic risk from their investment portfolios. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying
text. Given the evidence of the beneficial effects of firm-level risk reduction on shareholder
wealth that are analyzed in this paper, however, it seems more likely that the costs of diversify-
ing acquisitions merely outweigh the potential benefits. This could be due both to the large
premiums often paid in corporate combinations and to the possibility that large, highly diverse
firms are more difficult to manage. See GILsoN & BLACK, supra note 72, at 317 (discussing the
legal and administrative costs and the large premiums typically paid in a corporate acquisition);
Buckley, supra note 89, at 825 (discussing potential diseconomies of scale of large conglomer-
ates). Large, diverse firms may also have higher monitoring costs. This is because a conglomer-
ate firm's stock price reflects the value of all divisions, making shareholder monitoring of
individual division managers' performance more difficult. See id. at 826.
No. 4]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
could reduce the agency costs associated with debt through the use of
convertible bonds, more restrictive debt covenants, or investment in
less risky or more liquid assets. Each of these methods, however, may
impose substantial costs as well. For example, the use of convertible
bonds will force current owners to share upside profit with convertible
bondholders, reducing shareholders' equity interest.358 Likewise, re-
strictive debt covenants and restrictions on the liquidity or risk levels
of potential assets may impose costs by restricting the firm's invest-
ment options. 359 Furthermore, derivatives hedging may serve func-
tions unrelated to risk reduction that are not well served by other
alternatives. For example, derivatives hedging may decrease the noise
in firm performance, reduce systematic risk, or operate as an inexpen-
sive alternative to vertical integration.36 °
It is not my intent in this article to argue that all firms should
hedge or that those firms choosing to hedge should hedge fully. Many
corporate managers will no doubt determine after conducting a cost-
benefit analysis that the costs of hedging outweigh any risk reduction
benefits that may accrue to the firm. Rather, my purpose is to suggest
that the corporate hedging decision should be undertaken along with
and in the same manner as other decisions affecting shareholder
wealth that the firm's management is commonly required to make,
such as deciding whether to build a new factory, sell a division of mar-
ginal profitability, or embark on a new line of business.36 1
358. In a public corporation where shareholders typically are not concerned about maintain-
ing their percentage ownership interest, this cost may be negligible. In a smaller corporation or
in a corporation with a controlling shareholder or group, however, these concerns may be more
significant.
359. See supra text accompanying note 286 (discussing the potential costs of restrictive debt
covenants).
360. See supra notes 106-21 and accompanying text (Part III.B.1) (discussing hedging of
systematic risk); notes 215-26 (Part III.B.5) and accompanying text (discussing vertical
integration).
361. Although each of these actions may profoundly affect shareholder wealth, corporation
statutes typically leave these and similar decisions to the corporation's board of directors and
management. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §141(a) (1974) ("The business and affairs of
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation."); REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.01(b) (1998) ("All corporate powers
shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation
managed under the direction of, its board of directors, subject to any limitation set forth in the
articles of incorporation or in an agreement authorized under section 7.32."); HARRY G. HENN
& JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 71, at 128 (3d ed. 1983) ("The corporation
is managed by its board of directors, who are elected by the shareholders. Otherwise, the share-
holders' management functions are usually limited to approval of extraordinary matters.").
Shareholder control of the corporation is usually restricted to election of directors; adoption,
amendment, and repeal of by-law provisions; approval of amendments to the articles of incorpo-
ration; adoption of shareholder resolutions; the sale of all or substantially all of the corporation's
assets other than in the ordinary course of business; and the merger, consolidation or dissolution
of the company. See, e.g., id. § 188, at 490, § 195, at 517.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL POLICY
The realization that the corporate hedging decision is a business
decision, just like many other decisions impacting shareholder wealth
regularly made by corporate boards of directors and managements,
has profound implications for the appropriate legal policy that should
govern the firm hedging decision. Specifically, the decision of
whether and how much to hedge should be protected by the business
judgment rule, as are most other well-informed, disinterested manage-
ment decisions that may impact shareholder wealth.362 Calls for an
extensive re-evaluation of current legal norms governing the corpo-
rate hedging decision are thus misplaced and unwarranted.
Professor Hu, for example, has argued that the failure of corpo-
rate law to differentiate management's duties to the shareholders
from management's duties to the corporate entity has led to an intol-
erable dilemma in the derivatives hedging context.363 If management
owes a fiduciary duty primarily or exclusively to the shareholders,
then hedging firm-level risk in a large, public corporation with diversi-
fied shareholders violates that duty.36 4 If, on the other hand, manage-
ment's fiduciary duty is owed primarily to the corporate entity itself,
then management would breach that fiduciary duty by failing to
hedge.365 While this author agrees with Professor Hu's assertion that
corporate law should be clarified to specify precisely to whom man-
agement does and does not owe a fiduciary duty, this dilemma is
neither unique to the corporate hedging decision nor a more serious
concern in that context than in the context of the other investment
and operating decisions regularly made by firm management. In fact,
as previously indicated, the assertion that corporate hedging under-
mines shareholder wealth to the benefit of other corporate constituen-
cies, including management, is unsupported. Rather, the theoretical
and empirical evidence indicates that derivatives may be a low-cost
and effective method of aligning the often conflicting interests of
shareholders and other corporate constituents with respect to risk
management. By reducing the possibility of financial distress, deriva-
tive hedging benefits customers, suppliers, creditors, employees, man-
agement, and other stakeholders with an interest in the continued
viability of the firm. By reducing the contracting and agency costs
borne by the shareholders in transacting with these stakeholders, de-
rivatives hedging also enhances shareholder wealth.
In addition, Professor Hu has expressed concern that the advent
of widespread derivatives hedging raises important questions and po-
362. See supra notes 14-15, 83 (discussing the business judgment rule); infra note 375 and
accompanying text (same); supra note 361 and accompanying text (discussing the limited role of
shareholders in managing the corporation).
363. See Hu, New Financial Products, supra note 7, at 1308-09.
364. See id.
365. See id.
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tential conflicts between management duties to diversified and un-
diversified shareholders.366 For example, if some shareholders are
undiversified, then the law should address whether management can
or should hedge in order to benefit these undiversified investors, de-
spite the fact that such action, in his view, may harm diversified share-
holders.367 This raises questions as to whether and how management
should be required to gauge the level of shareholder diversification to
determine the risk preferences of individual shareholders.368
Again, corporate law modifications such as these are neither de-
sirable nor required. Even assuming that derivatives hedging harms
diversified shareholders, a contention for which there is little or no
supportive evidence, Merton Miller's investor clientele theory indi-
cates that a corporation's hedging policy is a commodity like any
other.3 6 9 To sell their "product" for the maximum amount possible,
corporations will either hedge or not hedge, depending on which in-
vestor clientele preferences are undersupplied. Corporations will
hedge if there is an unsatisfied demand for the securities of corpora-
tions that hedge and will not hedge if there is an unsatisfied demand
for the securities of corporations that do not hedge. In other words,
once the corporation settles on a hedging policy and discloses those
intentions, investors will sort themselves out according to risk prefer-
ence by buying and selling securities until the market approximates an
equilibrium point.370 In this regard, legal scholars who have advo-
cated greater disclosure of corporate derivatives usage are on the right
track.371
Finally, some commentators have expressed concern that the
1992 Indiana case of Brane v. Roth3 72 may be read to impose on all
boards of directors a fiduciary duty to adequately hedge firm-level
366. See Hu, Hedging Expectations, supra note 7, at 48; Hu, New Financial Products, supra
note 7, at 1309.
367. See Hu, Hedging Expectations, supra note 7, at 48 ("In evaluating hedging alternatives,
corporate managers and boards of directors need to supplement norm functions with considera-
tions pertaining to shareholder expectations."); Hu, New Financial Products, supra note 7, at
1309 ("If many shareholders (or a few particularly large shareholders) hold undiversified portfo-
lios through ignorance or legal constraint, should directors be required to act as trustees and thus
mandate diversification at the corporate level?").
368. See Hu, New Financial Products, supra note 7, at 1309 ("How would a corporation
know how diversified or sophisticated its shareholders are, other than through crude measures
like the extent of institutional investor holdings?"); Hu, Hedging Expectations, supra note 7, at
48 (arguing that "managements should try to make reasonable assumptions regarding whether
or not actual or potential shareholder[s] expect them to engage in hedging .... [A] high level of
institutional ownership typically suggests less of a need to reduce risk at the corporate level
because of the presumptively well-diversified nature of the investor.").
369. See VAN HORNE, supra note 43, at 264-65; Miller, supra note 68, at 268-69.
370. See VAN HORNE, supra note 43, at 568; Hu, Hedging Expectations, supra note 7, at 48;
Miller, supra note 68, at 268-69.
371. See Hu, Hedging Expectations, supra note 7, at 49; Krawiec, supra note 2, at 59-61.
372. See Brane v. Roth, 590 N.E.2d 587 (Ind. 1992).
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risk.373 This interpretation reads more into the court's opinion than is
warranted. Although the court's reasoning is disturbingly unclear, the
case should properly be read not to impose a fiduciary duty to hedge,
but to impose a duty to be fully informed and to properly supervise
employees once hedging has been undertaken.374 This is just an ex-
tension of the traditional corporate law rule that, in order to enjoy the
protection of the business judgment rule, management must not be
grossly negligent in failing to fully inform itself prior to making a busi-
ness decision or in failing to properly supervise employees.375
In Brane, the court found that the board of directors, after deter-
mining to hedge the corporation's risk of loss from fluctuations in
grain prices, hired an employee who was inexperienced and unknowl-
edgeable about derivatives, failed to inform itself of even the basics of
derivatives hedging and then failed to properly supervise the em-
ployee.376 If the board's lack of knowledge and oversight had caused
the cooperative to lose money on the employee's speculative or unau-
thorized derivatives trades, the decision to hold the board of directors
responsible would have been uncontroversial.377 The court found,
however, that the cooperative suffered losses due to the employee's
failure to hedge a large portion of the cooperative's risk exposure,
presumably because he did not adequately understand hedging strat-
egy and lacked oversight from a competent board.378 Unfortunately,
the court did not sufficiently clarify that the board's liability stemmed
373. See, e.g., Hu, Hedging Expectations, supra note 7, at 30 (discussing reactions of practic-
ing bar to Brane v. Roth); Gerry W. Markham, Fiduciary Duties Under the Commodity Exchange
Act, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 199, 201 n.8 (1992) (citing Brane v. Roth and stating that "[tihe
failure to hedge may be a violation of the fiduciary duties of the directors of a company with
hedgeable price risks."); Philip M. Johnson, Is Failing to Hedge a Legal Virus?, FUTURES, Nov.
1993, at 18, 18 (questioning whether, in light of Brane v. Roth, management may face per se
liability for failures to hedge avoidable risk).
374. See Brane, 590 N.E.2d at 589-90 (upholding lower court decision that grain cooperative
board of directors, after determining to hedge, failed to adequately inform itself of the funda-
mentals of hedging, hired an employee to oversee the program who had insufficient knowledge
and experience in derivatives hedging and then failed to supervise him properly); see also Eliza-
beth A. Smith, Recent Developments in Corporation Law, 26 IND. L. REV. 781, 795 (1993) ("The
court [in Brane] noted that the business judgment rule protects directors from liability, but only
if their decisions are informed ones.").
375. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[The business judgment rule] does
not apply in cases, e.g., in which the corporate decision ... results from an obvious and pro-
longed failure to exercise oversight or supervision."); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873
(Del. 1985) ("We think the concept of gross negligence is also the proper standard for determin-
ing whether a business judgement reached by a board of directors was an informed one.").
376. See Brane, 590 N.E.2d at 589-90.
377. Many derivatives end-users have suffered losses due to an employee's unauthorized
trades or from ill-informed speculations by inadequately supervised employees. See, e.g.,
Krawiec, supra note 2, at 40-43 (discussing losses of $1 billion at Barings, plc due to unauthor-
ized trades by 27-year old "rogue trader" Nicholas Leeson); id. at 24-30 (discussing large losses
at Gibson Greetings, Inc., Proctor & Gamble Company, and Orange County, California, due to
failures by employees to control market risk in each organization's derivatives portfolio and
failures by boards of directors (and, in the case of Orange County, county government officials)
to properly oversee derivatives activity).
378. See Brane v. Roth, 590 N.E.2d 587, 589-90 (Ind. 1992).
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
from its failure to be informed and vigilant, rather than from its failure
to fully hedge the cooperative's risk exposure, leading to potential
misinterpretation.379 Corporate management should not be held lia-
ble for a good faith, well-informed decision not to hedge corporate
risk, and courts citing to Brane have not done so for the purpose of
imposing on management an affirmative duty to fully or partially
hedge price risk.38 °
VII. CONCLUSION
This article attempts to rectify a previous weakness in derivatives
legal scholarship by extensively analyzing the potential impact of de-
rivatives hedging on shareholder value. This is in contrast to much
previous legal scholarship, which focused instead on the benefits ac-
cruing to the corporate entity from derivatives hedging. Contrary to
the assertions of some legal commentators who have analyzed this is-
sue, 381 this author concludes, based on both a theoretical and an em-
pirical analysis, that there are numerous potential benefits that may
accrue to corporate shareholders from risk reduction at the firm level.
There are, however, costs associated with the use of derivatives as
well. This implies that the decision of whether and how extensively to
hedge risk at the firm level should be made in the same manner and
along with the many other decisions corporate management is com-
monly required to make regarding how to best maximize shareholder
wealth.
The realization that the firm hedging decision is merely a business
decision like any other has profound implications for corporate legal
policy. Specifically, calls by some legal scholars for a broad rethinking
of traditional corporate legal norms in the derivatives hedging context
are misplaced. Rather, the firm hedging decision, just like the numer-
ous other investment and operating decisions commonly made by
management on behalf of the shareholders, should be protected by
the business judgment rule, so long as that decision is disinterested,
well-informed, and made in good faith.
379. See id. at 591-92.
380. In fact, as of the date of this article, all cites to Brane were in connection with other
issues decided in the case. None of the opinions citing Brane related to corporate use of
derivatives.
381. See supra note 7.
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